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ABSTRACT
It is in the nature and tradition of artists to use the works and ideas of other artists
within the context of their own work. Artists find copyright law restrictive and experience
difficulty in determining where to draw the line between using other artistic works as
inspiration and exploiting the skill and labour of others. In addition, the maxim that
there is no copyright in ideas, only in the expression of ideas, is not as simple as it
appears. This report is aimed at assisting the visual artist in aspects of copyright law,
specifically in relation to the distinction between ideas and the expression of ideas in a
material form.
The method used in the research is an analysis of South African legislation and cases
that illustrate the law in relation to ideas and the expression of ideas in an artistic work.
As a result of the dearth of case law and literature in South Africa dealing with copyright
and visual art, reference is made to American case law and the defence of fair use of an
artistic work, with reference to artist Jeff Koons.
The findings of the study are that the South African Courts are not in favour of allowing
artists to monopolise ideas or combinations of ideas and the definitive threshold of
originality is low. To constitute an infringement of an artistic work it is the artistic
features or attributes of the work that have to be transformed or adapted, not some
concept, that it conveys. An artist is therefore free to use the ideas of other artists,
provided that such ideas are expressed in a material form and they do not form a
substantial part of the work of another.
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INTRODUCTION
The leading authority on copyright law in South Africa, Dr Owen Dean (2006, p.1-42)
warns that copyright is both a restrictive and a technical subject. The exclusive rights of
an artist are couched in the negative - that is in the form of restricted activities - and
there is no actual definition of copying. In South Africa limited guidelines are available to
visual artists to determine just how much visual citation is legally allowed.
When assessing a case of copyright infringement in an artistic work attention must be
given to whether the similarity between two works is attributable to common ideas and
concepts embodied in them, or to similarity of material expression of ideas. Dean (2006,
p.1-42B) points sharply to the fact that:
Copyright, which is concerned with copying the outwardly perceptible form, must not be
confused with the rights conferred by a patent in respect of the conception that is its subject
matter, or the idea that is conveyed by a work. It is often difficult to decide in a particular
case whether the idea or its expression has been copied.
For the purposes of this report, the legislation referred to is the Copyright Act 98 of
1978, as amended, and is hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The Act defines an artistic
work irrespective of the artistic quality thereof as paintings, drawings, sculptures,
engravings, photographs and works of architecture being buildings or models of
buildings (Section 1(1)) of the Act. This report is concerned with visual art only.
In Chapter 1 of this report I discuss copyright and the notion of authorship and
originality in the art historical context, particularly in the context of Postmodernism. In
so doing I refer to artists such as Roy Lichtenstein (1923-1997), Candice Breitz (born
1972), Sherrie Levine (born 1947) and Jeff Koons (born 1955) as examples. These
artists appropriate images and have been criticised for infringing the copyright of others.
In Chapter 2 I deal with copyright infringement, with reference to the case of South
African artist Gerhard Marx who instituted legal proceedings against BMW South Africa
(Pty) Ltd and advertising agency, Ireland Davenport (Pty) Ltd, in 2006. The case was
settled out of Court in 2008. It highlights the difficulty artists have in distinguishing
between ideas and the expression of ideas; the meaning of concepts such as originality;
authorship and copying in the context of copyright law.
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In order for an infringement of copyright to take place an infringer must have performed
a restrictive activity that relates to a substantial part of the work (Section 1(2A). In this
regard I discuss two important cases: Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus 1989(1) SA
276A (hereinafter referred to as the Galago Publishers case), which established the test
for determining whether a substantial part of a work has been copied, and the case of
Rapid Phase Entertainment CC v SABC 1997 JOL 393 W (hereinafter referred to as the
Rapid Phase Entertainment case) which confirmed the current state of the law insofar as
the dichotomy between ideas and the expression of ideas is concerned. This case
incorporates the position taken in the important case of Natal Picture Framing Co v Levin
1920 WLD 35 hereinafter referred to as the Natal Picture Framing case.
In chapter 3 of the report I deal with the Postmodern artist Koons, to illustrate parody
and pastiche as part of Postmodern strategy and the way in which the American Courts
have dealt with the issues of copying ideas. In particular Koons' work brings into sharp
focus what constitutes a ‘substantial part’ of a work in the context of the defence of fair
use.
Chapter 4 is a summary of the findings of the report. Inter alia, I have ascertained that
on closer inspection of the tests applied to the facts in cases of copyright infringement,
that the terms 'originality' and 'author' are given defined meanings and have been
interpreted in case law. For example, depending on the medium used by an artist in the
making of an artistic work, the Act stipulates who the author is. In the case of
photographic works it is the composer of the photograph who is the author (Section
1(1)).
Freedom of expression and parody have not been established as defences to copyright
infringement in South Africa. The Constitutional Court decision in the case of Laugh It Off
Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark
International (Pty) and another1 is an example of how the Constitutional Court has
intervened in the arena of intellectual property law and should be read in the context of
trademark law.
Although the South African law makes provision for a number of statutory exceptions to
direct infringements of copyright, the doctrine of fair use is not applicable in South
1 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International
and another 2006(1)SA 144(CC)
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African copyright law. Instead there are exceptions to infringement of copyright limited
to specific activities and instances.
In conclusion, it is self evident that artists draw inspiration from other works of art. By
claiming that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’ artists who appropriate work of others
(which for the purposes of this report are hereinafter referred to as 'appropriation
artists') and Pop artists have subverted the concepts of authorship and originality as
they are understood in the art historical context.
Although artists need to be cautious when incorporating copyright images in their work,
in the context of South African law they have a great deal of latitude and freedom to use
other works of art as inspiration. First, there is no definition of ‘original’ in the Act.
‘Original’ in the context of copyright does not mean that the work must in any way be
inventive. The characteristics of novelty and creativity do not appear in the context of
copyright law. Originality relates to the degree of skill and labour involved in the making
of a work.
Second, in support of this contention, the Rapid Phase Entertainment case confirms the
decision of our Courts when it comes to guarding against the monopolization of ideas by
an artist. Based on this authority, artists have a great deal of latitude. To constitute an
infringement of copyright, the artistic features or attributes of a copyright work must be
transformed or adapted, not some concept or idea that it conveys. The amount copied
needs to be compatible with fair practice and must not exceed the extent justified by the
purpose.
An infringement of copyright may be justified. In South Africa the exceptions to
infringement are referred to by copyright lawyers as 'fair dealing'. Under American law
there is a well developed doctrine of fair use of a copyright work and in terms of which
the Courts support the appropriation of copyright images if the new work produced is
transformative (i.e. whether the work containing the appropriated images adds
something new, thereby furthering the purpose of the original and giving it new meaning
and expression).
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CHAPTER 1 - THE CONCEPTS OF ORIGINALITY, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYING IN
THE ART HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The main part of this research report deals with the difficulty that artists encounter when
making the distinction between the copying of an idea and the copying of an idea that
has been expressed in a material form. Where visual art is concerned it is the confluence
of art history and copyright law that highlights why such difficulties arise. Art history and
modern literary cultural criticism, together with their adoption of concepts from literary
theory, have given rise to confusion for artists who are not familiar with the definitions in
copyright law. Concepts such as originality, authorship and copying in the art historical/
art critical writing have acquired meanings that do not equate with the definitions for
these concepts in the Act, or the meaning the terms have acquired in case law.
It is to be expected that artists find copyright laws restrictive. American Copyright
lawyer, Emily Meyers (2007, p.219), remarks that 'throughout history artists have
imitated the work of others to learn their craft and pay homage to previous masters. A
pupil cultivated his own artistic skill and sensibility by emulating his teacher's technique
and rendering precise copies of his works'. This emulation did not have a stigma
attached to it because it was part of a learning process.
According to art theorist Moshe Barasch (1990, p.285) the 'position of the artist in
society and the fascination with creativity and productive inspiration has occupied the
thoughts of philosophers and poets for centuries'. Tracing the history of views
concerning the purposes of art and the methods of production is a research report on its
own, therefore I will deal briefly with the position of the artist in the modern and
Postmodern periods and theoretical movements such as Structuralism,
Post-structuralism and deconstruction that have influenced the ideas of artists and art
history. The main focus of this report is the legal position of the artist.
Laurie Schneider Adams (1996, p.102) makes the assertion that in the history of
Western art, artists were equated with gods, the 'former making life like figures and the
latter creating life itself'. As an example Adams singles out an illustration in the 13th
century manuscripts where God as the supreme artist is shown as drawing the universe
with a compass.
Frascina and Harrison (1982, p.1) remind us that 'the history of art is not simply a
history of works of art; it is also a history of ideas and interpretations. The works of
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critics and theorists have been influential in deciding how modern art is to be seen and
understood, they have also influenced the course it has taken.'
Art writer and theorist Anne D'Alleva (2005, p.154) traces the origins of the distinction
between an original and a copy to Plato, who considered the latter inferior to the former.
The concept of binary oppositions such as light/dark, original/copy can be attributed to
the linguist Ferdinand Saussure (1857-1913) and his successor French anthropologist
Levi-Strauss (b.1908). This theoretical movement known as Structuralism emerged in
France in the 1950s and 60s. Saussure emphasized that language is a system or
structure that pre-exists the individual speaker. Communication therefore always
employs pre-existing concepts; patterns and conventions. D'Alleva (2005, p.154) says
that 'one of the ideas of Structuralism is that the concept of authorship – the idea that
individual genius and expression determine the work of art - is itself a cultural construct
a legacy of the Renaissance'. This idea reached its peak in the Romantic era.
Post-structuralism and Deconstruction emerged as a critique of Structuralism in the
1960, and coincided with the emergence of Pop Art (D'Alleva p.136). Post-structuralism
and Deconstruction theory challenged the concept of binary opposites and reject
concepts such as originality and authorship. D'Alleva remarks that (2005, p.137) 'Post-
structuralists argue that structures are not some kind of universal, timeless truth, just
waiting to be uncovered. Rather, structures are fictions we create in order to be able to
interpret the world around us.
D'Alleva (2005, p135) explains that French cultural critic, Roland Barthes (1930-1980)
dramatically declared ‘the birth of the reader and the death of the author’ when he
moved away from rigid Structuralism and abandoned Saussure’s emphasis on language
as a system of structure that pre-exists the individual speaker. This explains how artists
have come to understand the concept of an author. These theories influenced both
literary and visual artists.
These theories and the Modernist and Postmodernist periods to which they are linked,
with their ideas on originality and authorship have influenced artists. This helps to
explain why artists have misunderstood the meaning of these terms in the context of
copyright law.
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Modernism and Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968)
D'Alleva (2005, p.149) argues that during the Modernist period there was a
deliberate rejection of the idea that artists should look to past academic teaching
traditions. This break with the past meant that artists had to invent forms
compositions, media and signs that would be adequate to express the novelty and
pace of the modern world. D‘Alleva (2005, p.149) discusses further the notion of
the avant-garde and ‘the idea of self consciously being at the cutting edge of
creating and seeking out the new, of attacking established institutions of art and
culture’.
In the tradition of rebellion during this modern period, Marcel Duchamp paved the
way for appropriation artists such as Jeff Koons' (1955), Candice Breitz (1972) and
Sherrie Levine (1947). In 1914, Duchamp (1887-1968) placed a Bottle–Rack on a
pedestal. Critical questions as to the conditions under which art is created were
raised. In the words of art writer Manfred Schneckenberger, (2005, p.320) ‘by
stripping an object of its utilitarian function putting a label on it and placing it in a
gallery – the object becomes art‘.
In 1917, Duchamp, who was associated with New York Dada, pushed the limits of
acceptability by signing a urinal R Mutt and placing it in a gallery.
The Dada group revolted against art and everything that paved the way to the First
World War. In 1919 Duchamp’s rebellion was, according to Schneckenberger (1998,
p.320), ‘prompted by the fact that art had become an industry, a buttress for a
social system that ignited the War. Unlike his successors Koons and Andy Warhol
(1928-1987), Duchamp revolted against art as a commodity.
During the period from 1905 -1920 the pioneers of the Cubist movement namely
Georges Braque (1882-1963) and Pablo Picasso (1881-1973) had begun to build
compositions out of abstract forms. In 1912 they began producing collages, pasting
pre-existing materials such as pieces of newspaper, textiles and wallpaper onto a
painted composition. Klaus Richter (2001, p.46) explains this method of working as
a radical departure from traditional style, since ‘these fragments of everyday life
removed from their normal function, became integral parts of the picture and thus
were raised to the level of art’.
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In 1943, Pablo Picasso appropriated a bicycle saddle and handlebars for a sculpture
he named Head of a Bull.
Structuralism Assemblage and New Realism
Richter (2001, p.107) connects the literary theory of Structuralism and
Post-structuralism from approximately 1950-1959 to the New Realism movement.
Artists such as Robert Rauschenberg (1925-1980), Jasper Johns (b.1930-) set out
to build the link between art and life. Two of the key techniques adopted were
collage and assemblage in which concrete objects were appropriated and included
into painting. This combination process gave rise in America to the term 'combine
painting' and in France' assemblage (Richter 2001, p. 110).
The combination of existing objects within a painting transcended the traditional
borderlines of art. Richter (2001, p.110) explains that ‘although the movement was
of brief duration, lasting only from about 1955-1960, it led without transition to Pop
Art ‘.
Richter says that 'Myths and the visionary world have always attracted both visual
and literary artists and they turned to themes of the bizarre and marvellous
because of the influence of literary theorists and perhaps as an escape from the
polarized politics of the Cold War.'
The reference to theory and myths can be traced to Saussure and Levi-Strauss’
theory on language systems and the explanation that cultural practices are made of
underlying structures. D‘Alleva explains that (2005, p.131) Structuralism views
cultural practices as being made of a system of underlying structures. According to
Saussure a sign is composed of two parts (a) signifier – the form the sign takes (b)
signified –the concept it represents. She remarks that Semioticians rather than art
historians recognized that semiotics might be a useful tool in the interpretation of
art. For example French philosopher Merleu Ponty (1908-1961) connected painting
and language because paintings are composed of signs assembled according to
syntax or logic in a similar way language is structured (D’Alleva 2005, p.36).
Levi-Strauss analyzed kinship, myths, totems and other cultural phenomenon as if
they were language systems. He argued that such phenomenon were built
according to structures inherent in the human mind, structures that cut across
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cultural differences. Levi-Strauss explains that myths, like language, are created
from units that are assembled according to known rules. French cultural critic
Roland Barthes applied structural analysis to contemporary Western culture, noting
that such structures were applicable to all societies, primitive and developed.
Myths are read as true and non-ideological as if their representations, the
relationships between their signifiers and signified are natural instead of
constructed In this regard D'Alleva (2005, p.133) says that for Barthes this meant
that myths can be used to justify dominant beliefs, values and ideas (D‘Alleva
2005, p.132).
D’Alleva (2005, p.134) says that in this manner Levi–Strauss introduced the idea of
binary oppositions. She uses examples such as beauty and ugliness selfishness /
altruism, public / private, violence / peace. These binary opposites were the logical
models found in myths. D'Alleva summarizes the ideas of Structuralism by saying
that the binary oppositions derive from Saussure’s basic idea of how signs are
defined in relation to each other. The paired antonyms are useful in explaining the
world and human experience. The binary opposites are not always equal in that
one term may be valued more highly than the other – she uses the example of sick
and healthy, raw and cooked.
Pop Art Post-structuralism Deconstruction and Postmodernism
Post-structuralism that grew out of Structuralist theories in the 1960s and 1970s.
For D’Alleva (2005, p.136), Post-structuralism occurred because of the problems
with Structuralism. D‘Alleva says (2005, p.135) that Barthes moved away from
rigid Structuralism by going so far as to say that it is language that speaks and not
the author ‘simply put, when writing, the author does not work from signified to
signifier instead writing meant working with signifiers and letting signifiers take care
of themselves'. This explains how artists have come to understand and question the
concept of an author.
D‘Alleva says (2005, p.135) that the rejection of the author was part of a larger
rejection of the Humanist idea of the autonomous thinking, coherent integrated
human subject. In the art historical context, D’Alleva says that Barthes interprets a
work of art or literature as an artefact that brings together any number of codes
available in the artist's or author's culture.
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Post-structuralism coincided with the emergence of Pop Art. The theorists were
arguing that the meaning of texts and structures are dependent on the conventions
of writers. For Post-structuralism meaning is a lot less stable than Structuralism
would suggest. D’Alleva says that Post-structuralism (2005, p.136) emphasizes’ the
constant slippage in the play of signs, in relations between signifies and signifier’.
Lippard traces (1966, p .80) the term Pop Art to British art critic Lawrence Alloway
who explains the source of the images created to the comics, billboards and cowboy
movies rather than ‘their fine art progeny’. In the words of Lippard. (1966, p.82)
‘The broad and instant appeal of Pop Art in America may indeed have been because
the exposure to popular images is an experience shared by all Americans’.
Jesse Wilder (1998, p.339) establishes the emergence of Pop Art as a reaction
against the Cold War and Abstract Expressionism. Artists reacted by reviving
realism and returning to stability. Unlike Duchamp, the Pop Artists turned to
popular culture for inspiration embracing, commercialization rather than reacting
against it.
Karl Ruhrberg (1998, p.270) casts Ed Ruscha (1937-) ’as the first Pop artist to
appropriate the comic strip with Lichtenstein and Warhol following shortly
afterwards’. In the mid sixties Ruscha began to combine words with images. His
work added to the debate about what art can and cannot represent. He also
questions its role in society. Much like Duchamp, Ruscha had an affinity for
conceptual art.
Ruhrberg (1998, p.322) succinctly extracts the characteristics of Pop Art by quoting
the words of art writer Hans Richter:
The purest and most radical elements of Pop Art are reflected in the conformist
work of Andy Warhol, namely: the blow up, the isolation or serial presentation
of motifs, a waiver of expressiveness and individual touch in favour of an
impersonal style; a limitation of subject matter to actual commercial
commodities and mass media imagery; a congruity of motif and style a
preference as in advertising for brand new objects (as opposed to the worn
and used ones employed by Johns and Rauschenberg; a waiver of all ideology;
critique and metaphorical reference and finally a favouring of technical
reproduction process.
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Ruhrberg links Lichtenstein’s famous use of the cartoon with the recycling of found
objects and common household items typical of Pop of Art in the sixties.
Ruhrberg (1998 p.322) raises Lichtenstein to the level of one of his comic book
heroes when he says 'Lichtenstein monumentalized the comic strip and yet also
turned the tables on high art, stripping the mythical trappings from the sublime and
sacred icons of Western culture by dissolving them into the sterile dot patterns of
commercial printing methods'.
Ruhrberg (1998, p.322) quotes art writer Hans Richter as stating that 'Pop Art' was
not about art or an art of protest like Dada but a record of artists’ acceptance of
and conformity with cotemporary consumerism'. Ruhrberg (1998, p.98) interprets
Richter’s view when he logically represents Richter’s words by saying that ’Pop Art
was nothing but a derivative of a neo Dada Style that did not seek to protest
against social and political conditions‘. I agree with Ruhrberg, the common link
between Pop Art and Dada being the appropriation of existing images and objects
and re-contextualizing them without emphasizing the intention of the artist in doing
so.
Concepts of originality and authenticity became less significant in the works of
artists such as Andy Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein. Meyers (2007, p.225) attributes
this to the speed and ease of production of images in the Pop Art era. In 1961
Lichtenstein began his first Pop paintings using cartoon images and techniques
derived from the appearance of commercial printing. Lichtenstein's work Drowning
Girl (1963) was appropriated from the lead story in DC Comics' Secret Hearts #83.
Lippard (1966, p.90) says that 'for Lichtenstein, copying and appropriation of
images was justified by the manner in which he transformed objects and changed
the viewer's perception of everyday objects'.
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Figure 1
Roy Lichtenstein, Drowning Girl, (1963)2
Oil on canvas
172.7 x 172.7cm
Figure 2
Roy Lichtenstein,
Roy Lichtenstein clipping from resort section of the Sunday New York Times 1961
to be compared with Girl with Ball I [figure 3]
(Lippard 1966, p.86)
2 Moma the Museum of Modern Art (2011) [online] Available at
http://www.moma.org/modernteachers/large_image.php?id=200 [9 February 2011]
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Figure 3
Roy Lichtenstein, Girl with Ball (1963)
Oil on Canvas 65x 36 inches
(Lippard 1966, p. 87)
Figure 4
Whaam! (1963)
Acrylic and oil on Canvas
diptych measuring 1.7 x 4.0 m
Lichtenstein's painting [4] Whaam! (1963), is an early example of Pop Art and is a
direct appropriation from a comic-book panel from a 1962 issue of DC Comics' All-
American Men of War. (Tate (2004) Roy Lichtenstein work [online], available at:
http://www.tate.org.UK/serviet/viewwork?workid=8782 [9 February 2011]) The
painting depicts a fighter aircraft firing a rocket with a colourful red-and-yellow
explosion. The cartoon style is heightened by the inclusion of the text 'Whaam!' and
'I pressed the fire control... and ahead of me rockets blazed through the sky...'
Although the images were changed in scale, the examples above illustrate how
Lichtenstein appropriated substantial parts of images.3
3 http://www.tate.org.UK/serviet/viewwork?workid=8782
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Figure 5
Andy Warhol Flowers 1964
Silkscreen on canvas 24x24 cm4
Andy Warhol (1928-1987) appropriated objects and images from his surrounding
visual culture for use in his art . Lippard (1966, p.87) explains that the concept
used by the Pop artists was to isolate the subject and present it in an unforeseen
way so that the viewer has the chance to see it through new eyes. By appropriating
copyright objects into their art both Warhol and Lichtenstein defied notions of
authorship and originality. Meyers (2007, p.227) points out that the appropriation
of images is in conflict with copyright law even though 'prior to 1960 very few cases
of copyright infringement were brought before the judiciary. The Dadaists
appropriated images as far back as 1916, however Warhol and Rauschenberg were
the first artists to be sued for unauthorised use of privately owned images'.
Meyers (2007, p.228) observes that such a dearth could either mean that artists
whose work has been appropriated cannot sue because of the strict requirements or
proving a case of copyright infringement against an offender or because of the
inadequacy of the law and legal system to protect artists.
More recently artist Koons has become embroiled in copyright law litigation.
Although there is no reported case law on Breitz and Levine (amongst many other
contemporary artists), they have also departed from the traditional use of images
4 Lippard, 1966, p.128
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and use existing images and objects both from other artists and advertisements. As
Meyers remarks (2007, p.228) 'they challenge the viewer's conceptions of art and
iconography by freely borrowing and rework existing images in an attempt to
reshape their audience's perception of these images'. In my opinion this is what
Lichtenstein endeavoured to achieve by isolating certain snapshots from the comics
and changing the scale, colour of the original copyright image. Jesse Wilder (1998,
p.372) describes the modus operandi of Postmodern artists when he says that they
‘thrive on mixing things and creating hybrids that remind viewers of originals while
adding something distinctly contemporary’.
Postmodernism, Deconstruction, Koons and Breitz
In art making, Postmodernism is associated with a rejection of the rigid truths and
hierarchies of Modernism, an interest in past traditions that Modernism rejected,
pastiche, the varied mixture of elements and motifs and a return to figurative
imagery (D’Alleva 2005, p.150). Postmodern critics such as Jurgen Habermas, Jean
Baudrillard, Frederic Jamieson, Rosalind Krauss explore the Postmodernist critique
of the central truths of Modernism. They challenge dichotomies such as
culture/nature; image/reality; innovation/tradition; high art/low art.
D'Alleva says (2005, p.150) that the key challenge of Postmodernism is the idea of
a single unified whole subject speaking from one place with a sense of authority.
Instead the Postmodern subject is decentred, speaking from a particular place with
only his or her viewpoint. Postmodernism does not argue for the death of the
subject, like Post-structuralism, so much as work towards new theories and
practices of speaking, writing and acting subjects. Instead of negating or
celebrating the individual subject, the emphasis is on how codes, texts, images and
other cultural practices and artefacts shape subjectivity.
Postmodernism is also associated with pluralistic thought, that is, the idea that
there is no correct way of seeing the world. The fragmentation of the subject
replaces the alienation of the subject that characterizes Modernism. According to
Frederic Jamieson the fragmentation of the subject develops because of the new
ways of living in the world and occupying space that have developed in late
capitalism (2005, p.153).
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D’Alleva says that ‘late capitalism has transcended the ability of the individual
human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually
and to map its position in the vast, multinational network of communication and
capital in which we are all caught’.
Late capitalism aspires to this hyperspace, and unprecedented vastness of scale.
Koons responds to this in his oversized sculptures of inflatable objects such as
flowers and animals.
Ruhrberg says that Koons is a media star that introduced the iconography of kitsch
into sculpture (2001, p.572) with or without breaks and ambivalence. He implies
that Koons is a product of late capitalism when he says ‘Koons is very much a figure
of his time an artist who rose with the art boom that continued in the late eighties’.
Jamieson cites the artist Andy Warhol’s work as a prime example of a world
transformed into images of itself. French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (b.1929)
explores the simulacrum, the copy without an original. Baudrillard points out that in
mass media there is no signified attached to a signifier, there is no reality, no thing
that the signifier reproduces or represents. In this way the simulacrum, the image,
becomes the reality.
The emergence of the simulacrum threatens the very foundations of Western
thought, which since the time of Plato has made a distinction between original and
a copy, the latter being inferior and of less value (D’Alleva 2005, p.154).
Marcella Beccaria (2006, p.25) says Breitz has been criticised for her appropriation
from Hollywood movies and the use of photographs as still images. She has reacted
to criticism of her infringement of copyright by stating that 'we buy our rights every
time we go to the movies, every time we buy a CD, every time we switch on the
television or read a glossy magazine'. The purchasing of images in a magazine or
from a DVD however does not entitle an artist to use such images in his / her work
and cannot be equated with paying a royalty to the artist whose skill and labour is
appropriated by such use.
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Childers and Hentzi, (1995, p.279) remark that:
In much modern art, the simulacrum refers not to some objective truth against which it
can be judged, but only to other simulacra. While this condition is necessarily
disorientating, it is also liberating in that it renders absolute the hierarchies assumed by
the Platonic tradition. Recognising the special application of this line of thought to the
culture of our era, Jean Baudrillard has made the concept of the simulacrum central to
his analysis of postmodern consumer society. According to Baudrillard, the media with
its endless networks and advertising images precede any reality to which they might be
said to refer.
Following this line of argument American copyright lawyer Willajeanne McLean
(1993, p.390) says that the techniques employed by Postmodern artists to create
multiple editions often fabricated by others also strain the idea of authorship and
originality. In the hands of certain Postmodernist artists, therefore, the concept of
an author is questioned and derivative works are abundant. For Mclean (1993,
p.391) 'it is not surprising that the underlying and incompatible notions of
appropriation and copyright would lead to litigation'. She is more surprised that
there have been few reported cases concerning the infringement of an artistic work.
Like Meyer, Mclean also remarks that the cases against Warhol never went to trial
and were settled out of court. Amicable settlements and the high costs of litigation
are deterring factors which have resulted in few reported cases.
American artist Sherrie Levine (1947) rejects any belief in the concept of the
original. For her (in McLean, 1993, p.383),
The world is filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every stone. Every work,
every image is leased and mortgaged. We know a picture is but a space in which a
variety of images, none of them original, blend and clash. A picture is a tissue of
quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. We can only imitate a
gesture that is always anterior, never original. Succeeding the painter, the plagiarist no
longer bears within him passions, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense
encyclopaedia from which he draws.
Mclean (1993, p.384) interprets this quote by adopting an essentially
Baudrillardean position. Levine's work reflects the ethos of the prevailing climate of
artists working within the Postmodern paradigm, they have no alternative but to
draw from the immense volumes of images that constantly bombard society. She
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goes on to state that 'artists must create, in circumstances where they claim there
is truly nothing new under the sun'. (1993, p.383)
Figure 6
Sherrie Levine, After Walker Evans: 2 (1981)
Gelatin silver print 9.6 x 12.8cm5
In the rebellious Postmodern spirit of focusing on the recycling of commodities and
images, Sherrie Levine (b194 7-) [Figure 6] re-photographed photographs by
modernist photographer Walker Evans (1903-1975). According to Phaidon’s Photo
Book (1997, p.143) Evans was hailed as ‘one of photography’s outstanding artists,
a perfectionist whose unselfconscious works are honoured in his very own very
attentive compositions‘. The photographs by Evans were taken in 1935 and
re-photographed by Levine in 1981. The period of copyright on photographs in
South Africa is fifty years from the end of the year in which the photograph is made
available to the public with the consent of the owner of the copyright or is first
published; whichever term is longer (Section 3(2)(b)). Art critic Peter Plagens
(2009, p.67) interprets Sherrie Levine's After Walker Evans: 2 (1981) as
questioning the very possibility of whether a photograph can be an original work of
art. Levine defends her position by arguing that if all Evans did was to take a
picture, and develop it, then any print from the negative of a photograph of that
print is equally a work of art (Plagens, 2009, p.67). Although it could be argued
that Levine's work is not original, for the series After Walker Evans:2, Levine
5 The Metropolitan Museum of Art (2011) After Walker Evans:2 [online], available at
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/1995.266.2 [9 February 2011]
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avoided any threat of litigation by using images that were no longer subject to
copyright and have fallen into the public domain6.
Candice Breitz
Nadine Rubin (2009, p77), a New York based art critic remarks that 'films have
been more than just an inspiration for the Berlin based South African artist Candice
Breitz born (1972), they are the raw material that she slices, dices, manipulates
and reshapes'. To produce the work Her Rubin remarks that 'Breitz sifted through
three decades of films starring Meryl Streep while / and for Him she went through
movies headlined by Jack Nicolson'. According to Rubin (p.77) Breitz's 'brilliant
editing', or, in copyright terms, her skill and labour in editing the films, has created
interest in her work. Rubin, implies that Breitz's use of these films is an
'opportunistic attempt to cash in on the notoriety of their famous subjects.' Rubin
(2009, p.77) says, ' Breitz defends her position by claiming that Nicholas and
Streep are not the true subjects of Him and Her. Rather, she insists that her focus
lies instead on the unconscious mainstream cinema; the values of meaning that
slowly start to make themselves legible when the big plots are stripped away.
6 The photographs by Walker Evans were published in the United States of America, in 1935, prior to the
commencement of the 1976 Copyright Act. The writer is not aware of the actual date of expiry of the
copyright in the Walker Evans photographs.
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Figure 7
Candice Breitz, Him (2008)
Still photograph from a seven-channel video installation7
Rubin (2009, p.77) quotes Breitz as saying that: she (Breitz) 'shapes her
borrowings enough for her work to achieve autonomy and induce deep reflection on
the gender biases that Hollywood has perpetrated for close to half a century. Rubin
(2009, p.77) questions Breitz's ability to pay for the rights to the film material she
appropriates - or how she gets away with not paying. In my opinion although there
appear to be direct appropriations of portions of copyright movies, there are no
reported cases in which Breitz has been sued and it could be argued that her work,
although it infringes copyright, would be interpreted as original in the context of the
Act.
7 (Beccario 2006, p.57)
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Figure 8
Candice Breitz, Her (2008)
Still photograph from a seven-channel video installation8
Breitz also exhibits still photographs from the video installations as part of her
exhibitions. This in itself is an infringement of Section 8 of the Act. The owner of
copyright in a cinematograph film has the exclusive right to make still photographs
from the film or to reproduce it in any manner or form. Breitz reproduces parts of
cinematograph art and exhibits these parts as video installations.
Jeff Koons
In the Andrea Blanch and Jeff Koons case, Judge Sack remarked (2005, p.3) that:
'Artist Koons is known for incorporating objects and images taken from popular
media and consumer advertising, a practice that has been referred to as neo pop
art or, unfortunately in a legal context, appropriation art'.
8 (Beccario 2006, p.70)
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Figure 9
Jeff Koons (1988)
Lithograph 114.3 x 94.6cm9
Edition of 50 plus 10 Artist's Proofs
Koons has been the target subject of litigation involving the infringement of
copyright. The high profile reported cases of Art Rogers v Koons and Blanch v
Koons have had an influence on the thinking of visual artists both locally and
abroad10. They are important for visual artists because they highlight the idea /
expression dichotomy, the defence of fair use in the United states of America and
the exceptions to copyright infringement in South Africa (also known as fair
dealing). They also raise the question of parody as a defence to copyright
infringement (as opposed to trademark infringement) and the applicability of the
constitution to the intellectual property rights and the moral rights of an artist.
Art critics have identified both Breitz and Koons as appropriation artists. Emily
Meyers (2007, p.220) says that the definition of appropriation art as it appears in
the Oxford English Dictionary, namely the practice or technique of reworking the
images or styles contained in earlier works of art, especially in later use in order to
provoke critical re-evaluation of well known pieces by presenting them in new
contexts, or to challenge notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art,
9 Jeff Koons (2011) Art Magazine Ads (Art) [online] available at http://www.jeffkoons.com/site/index.html
[9 February 2011]
10 Rogers v Koons 751 F. Supp. 474 S.D.N.Y. 1990, Blanch v Koons No 03CIV.8026(LLS), S.D.N.Y., Nov.1,
2005 affirmed by the Second Circuit in October 2006, brought over Koons' use of a photographic
advertisement as source material for legs and feet in a painting, Niagara (2000). The Court ruled that
Koons had sufficiently transformed the original advertisement so as to qualify as a fair use.
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accurately describes a significant aspect of 20th and 21st century art in which the
referenced work is an undisguised, blatant and recognisable portion of the new
composition. For Meyers (2007 p.220) this is justified because 'by using the
appropriated image as the subject rather than merely referring to its form, style or
composition, it challenges and invites the viewer to participate in discovering the
genesis of the new work'.
Meyers (2007, p.221) says that the practice of appropriation is so ubiquitous that in
1978 the Whitney Museum of American Art mounted an exhibition entitled Art
about Art that displayed a variety of examples of artistic appropriation through
time. She quotes Leo Steinberg, art critic and writer of the introduction to the
catalogue that accompanied the exhibition as saying:
Basically, art is always about art, and art history is a cumulative progression of what
has come before. Artists, because of their obvious interest in and knowledge of art,
draw on this knowledge and familiarity as readily as they draw on other experience. An
artist may reuse existing images, along with other elements, because they are available
and sustainable; and because they may give the borrower and the newly formed work
a place within the ongoing history of art. The history of art is a continuum in which new
art consistently builds upon old, either by absorbing or rejecting styles and forms.
Meyers (2007, p.243) favours appropriation art as she is of the view that the way in
which artists have appropriated the works of art of others has fundamentally
altered aesthetic conventions and challenges the concept of what works of art
represent; what unifies a work of art. She opens the door to the application of
literary theory to art theory by adding that appropriation art 'opens up to debate
the more recent romantic definition of what constitutes originality and authenticity
in a work of art'.
Meyers (2007, p.219) generalises when she says that 'because many artists and
scholars of art history lack the specialised legal knowledge required to understand
their rights under the existing copyright system they fear legal prosecution for their
use of existing images and works'. Artists gain inspiration from other art and
whether the thought of copyright infringement is in the forefront of their minds
when a work of art is created is debatable. Artists have not stopped creating art
because they fear prosecution in terms of the Act. The question as to whether
artists are justified in using the skill and labour of a third party without consent,
compensation or the payment of any royalty is the aim of copyright law. In the case
Research Report/#879528v1
03082011
23
of Rapid Phase Entertainment, Wunsch J concluded his judgement by remarking
that that the degree of appropriation of an idea or concept is wrongful if the
community would treat it as unfair, dishonest or contrary to morality.
When the term of copyright in a work has expired it falls into the public domain and
the former restrictions on its use and exploitation cease to have any effect. The
work becomes free for all to use (Dean, 2006, p.1-31). As referred to in Chapter 1,
D'Alleva (2005, p154) links the focus of capitalism with the recycling of old images
and commodities. She says that 'Postmodern art and theory challenge the very idea
of originality, the very notions of progress and the continual remaking of
civilisation'. Postmodern South African artist Penny Siopis (1953 -), appropriates
and copies the artistic features of the work Fuseli's Nightmare (1781) [figure 10]
for use in her work Blush Scarlet [figure 11] to comment on the Postmodern trend
of recycling old images the reinventing of the past. In South Africa, the duration of
copyright in an artistic work (other than photographs) is the life of the author and
50 years from the end of the year in which the artist dies11.
It could be argued that the duration of copyright in an artistic work is over
generous and this inhibits artists in creating new works that are transformative in
nature. In this regard the interests of the parties require balancing. In the following
chapter I discuss infringement and what this entails for the artist. The importance
of recognising transformative works is dealt with in chapter 3.
11 Provided that if before the death of the author none of the following acts had been done in respect of such
works or an adaptation thereof, namely-
(i) the publication thereof;
(ii) the performance thereof in public;
(iii) the offer for sale to the public of records thereof;
(iv) the broadcasting thereof;
The term of copyright then continues to subsist for a period of fifty years from the end of the year in which
the first of the said acts is done (Section 3(2)).
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Figure 10
Henry Fuseli, Fuseli's Nightmare (1781)12
Figure 11
Penny Siopis, Blush Scarlet (2005)13
Oil mixed media and found object on paper
100 x 140cm
12 Johnson 2003, p.451
13 The South African Art Times, July 2010, p.9
Research Report/#879528v1
03082011
25
CHAPTER 2 - INFRINGEMENT
In the introduction to this report I remarked that throughout art history artists have
copied the art of others as a learning process. Artists draw inspiration from other art and
in certain instances an artist may appropriate an image or copy the work of other artists
as a social commentary or to reject the modernist characteristics of originality and
authorship.
It is not a breach of copyright to either borrow an idea or to translate that idea into a
new work. The difficulty is distinguishing between permissible borrowing and exploitation
the skill, labour and the rights of another artist14.
In this chapter I discuss infringement of copyright in an artistic work. This entails an
examination of:
(a) What entitles an artistic work to copyright protection?
(b) What are the rights of the artist?
(c) What constitutes infringement of another artist's copyright right and what does
copying mean?
In assessing the issues identified in (a), (b) and (c) above, there is an added difficulty,
which relates to whether the ideas of an artist, even when expressed in a material form
are or should be protected, especially if such protection would lead to one artist having a
monopoly over common techniques or combinations of ideas.
I use the case of South African artist Gerhard Marx in this report as an example to
illustrate the difficulty that artists have with the dichotomy of separating ideas from the
expression of those ideas in the context of copying. (This case was settled out of court
confidentially between the parties). Marx's case also introduces the reader to the
interface between copyright law and the common law delictual remedy of passing off.
Lastly in this chapter there is an extensive discussion on the Rapid Phase Entertainment
case also known as the Madam & Eve case, where the Court dismissed both a copyright
infringement claim and delictual claim of passing off.
14 This principle is discussed by Lord Foscote in the case of Designer Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles)
Limited (trading as Washington DC) 2000 UKHL 58, (2001), All ER 700.
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(a) What Entitles an Artistic Work to Copyright Protection?
For copyright to subsist in a work, the work relied on must fall within the category
of an artistic work (defined in Section 1). It must be original (Section 2) and must
exist in a material form (i.e. other than as a concept in the mind of the artist). In
addition an artist who wishes to sue for copyright infringement must be a qualified
person: i.e. a citizen, resident or domiciled in the Republic of South Africa15. These
are the technical requirements of the Act and without any sufficient proof of these
requirements an action will fail. Each of these requirements is dealt with in more
detail.
An artistic work defined in terms of the Act (Section 1(1)) means –Irrespective of
the artistic quality thereof –_ (a) paintings, sculptures, drawings, engravings and
photographs; _ (b) works of architecture, being either buildings or models of
buildings; or (c) works of craftsmanship not falling within either paragraph (a)
or (b).
Originality
Section 2 of the Act provides that an artistic work is eligible for protection, if it
is original. There is no definition of 'original' in the Act. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines original as: 'unique, innovative, inventive or creative'.
However the word 'original' in relation to an artistic work has developed a
meaning through case law.
The concept of what constitutes an artistic work within the Act and the concept
of originality are intertwined, since without a sufficient degree of originality a
work will not come into existence16. In the leading Waylite Diary case17 it was
held that original does not mean that the work must be in any way unique or
15 If the artist is a juristic person such as a company or a corporation then such entity must be incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa (Section 3). The works of international artists or
companies will be protected in terms of South African law. The Minister of Trade and Industry (Section 1)
has promulgated regulations (Section 37) whereby the Act applies to works of foreign original (Regulation
GN136/1989, Dean, p.1-88E). If the work does not fall within the provisions of Section 3 will be protected
by work that is first published in the Republic of South Africa (Section 4).
16 Blakeney and Mc Keough Intellectual property: Commentary and Materials (1987) at 27 quoted in Waylite
Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA645 (A) at p.649
17 Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) S.A. 645(A)
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inventive, but merely that it should not be commonplace, trite or trivial. On
the authority of the Accesio Allforms Case18 Dean (2006, p.1-15) says that:
Originality is a matter of degree, depending on the amount of skill, judgment or
labour involved in the making of the work. A work can still be original
notwithstanding that it has been copied from a previous work, provided sufficient
skill and effort has been embodied in creating the subsequent work. Where a
work embodies existing subject matter, the Court must decide whether the artist
has expended sufficient independent effort to justify a claim that the work is
original.
The Appeal Court's decision in the Appleton and Another v Harnischfeger
Corporation case, (p.262) confirms that the test for originality does not require
that the work should embody a new expressive thought in a new and inventive
form, but refers to original skill and labour (Dean, 2006, p.1-16). This test is
an interesting contrast to the definition of original in the Oxford dictionary.
In the earlier Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v Gray case de Kock J, stated that:
Originality refers to original skill and labour in execution, not to original thought
or expression of thought. What is required is not that the expression or thought
must be in an original or novel form but that the work must emanate from the
author.
The author of an artistic work is the person by whom the arrangements
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken (Section 1). Dean aptly
points out that 'since novelty is not a requirement, this test is essentially a
subjective one and will focus on how the artist went about creating his work,
albeit similar to others' (Dean, 13, 2006, p.1-18).
Existence in a Material Form: Ideas and the Expression of the Idea
In the leading case of Galago Publishers19 the Court confirmed that there is no
copyright in ideas. It is the material form of expression of the idea that is
subject to copyright (Dean p1-18). In the later Rapid Phase Entertainment
18 Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645A
19 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus 1989(1) SA 276A
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case20 the Court again confirmed that the artistic features or attributes of the
work are the subject of protection not some concept it conveys. The distinction
between expression and ideas is also mentioned in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to which South Africa became a
party in 1994 (TRIPS article 9.2). TRIPS has influenced South African copyright
law in that it aims at a reasonable degree of standardization of forms and
levels and the granting of protection to foreign works on a reciprocal basis
(Dean 2006, p.1-91). 'Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not
to ideas…. it all depends on what you mean by ideas.' This remark by Lord
Hailsham in the English case of Designer Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles)
Ltd21 points to the difficulty in ascertaining in any particular case whether the
idea or the expression has been copied. In the South African case of Jacana
Education (Pty) Ltd v Frandsen Publishers case22 the Court held that -
It is the way in which information is arranged that will attract copyright. An idea,
no matter how original, cannot be protected. It is the embodiment of that idea
that is the subject of the protection.
Dean (2006, p.1-18) also cautions that the maxim that there is no copyright in
ideas, only in the expression of ideas is too simplistic. He states that whilst it
is true that no copyright can subsist in ideas alone, once they have been
expressed in a material form they become integral to the work. In my opinion
however this raises another difficulty as to whether common ideas and
concepts even if expressed in a material form and are integral to a work can
be protected. This conundrum (as Dean p. 1-18 refers to it) is known as the
idea /expression dichotomy and it manifests itself in cases dealing with
copyright infringement.
The authority for the maxim that there is no copyright in ideas was established
in the early case of Natal Picture Framing v Levin (1920) WLD 35. (hereinafter
referred to as the Natal Picture Framing case) I have quoted the facts and
judgement in this case extensively as they provide a clear example of how
20 Rapid Phase Entertainment CC v SABC 1997 JOL 393 W at 606-7
21 Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone said in L.B. (Plastics) Ltd v. Swish Products Ltd. [1979] R.P.C. 551, 629.
And quoted in Designer Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (Trading As Washington Dc) [2000]
UKHL 58; [2001] 1 All ER 700; [2000] 1 WLR 2416 (23rd November 2000)
22 Jacana Education (Pty) Ltd v Frandsen Publishers 1998(2) SA 965 (SCA)
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ideas can be copied and expressed in a different way and yet still infringe
copyright in another artist's work. In this case it was held that:
Although there is no copyright in ideas, but merely in the representation of idea,
an idea once represented has an important bearing on the question of whether
one artistic work is a copy or colourable imitation of another. Where an original
combination of ideas is represented, any other representation of the same
combination, even with variations in detail, may in fact be an infringing copy or
colourable imitation.
The facts in the Natal Picture Framing v Levin case
Natal Picture Framing Company applied to Court for an order restraining the
alleged infringement by Levin of copyright in a certain picture entitled Vrijheids
Deputatie reproduced in lithograph and sold in the form of prints. Mr. Levin
had a picture entitled Republiek Deputatie reproduced and sold in the same
way. In the court papers Levin argued that he had made use of an idea first
used by the Natal Picture Framing Company but that there is no copyright in
ideas, and furthermore there was no similarity between the two works. Levin
asserted that 'the treatment of the idea is quite different in his picture'.
The Court rejected Levin's argument and came to the conclusion that Levin
adopted Natal Picture Framing Company's combination of ideas, reproducing
them with slight differences of detail. This made the second picture, in the
Court's opinion, a colourable imitation, calculated to deceive any person who
had a general recollection of the Natal Picture Framing Company's picture. In
the next Section of the judgement the Court extended the simple maxim that
there is no copyright in the ideas only in the expression of ideas, to a
combination (my emphasis) of ideas:
It has been pointed out that there is no copyright in ideas, but merely in the
representation of ideas (Hollinrake v Truswell, 1894, 3 Ch. at p.427, per LINDLEY,
L.J.). Still the idea represented may have an important bearing on the question
whether one picture is a copy or colourable imitation of another. A commonplace
idea may be represented; for example, A tea caddy, or a boy and a girl making
love at a stile. All representations of such an idea must necessarily have much in
common, and unless there is an exact copy it may be impossible to say that one
is a copy or imitation of another. But where an original combination of ideas is
represented, any representation of that combination, even though there may be
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many variations of detail, can easily be a copy or colourable imitation of the
original representation. Here the respondent's picture is a fancy combination. It
shows the deputation sailing from Cape Town, a cheering crowd at the docks,
medallions containing portraits of the members of the deputation and a title
'Vryheid's Deputatie.' It contains within it all that is in the applicant's picture, with
slight variations. For instance, in the respondent's picture the ship has just been
put out to sea, instead of being still alongside the quay as in the applicant's
picture. The cheering crowd is on the left of the picture instead of the right and
the figures are larger. The medallions containing the portraits are identical but
arranged in a somewhat different order. And the title is 'Republiek Deputatie'
instead of 'Vrijheids Deputatie.' There are also other minor differences of detail.
As I have said, the respondent's artist had the plaintiff's picture in his possession,
whether it was actually before him when he drew his own or not.
The basic principle of the law set out in Natal Picture Framing case raises 3
difficulties: First, does the law protect common or trivial ideas or combinations
of ideas? Second, should the law allow ideas even expressed in a material
form to be monopolised by an artist? Third, in assessing whether a substantial
part of a work has been copied would common ideas be eliminated from the
test when a comparison of the works is done? I will return to this debate in
more detail under the heading of infringement and when considering the test
for copying of a substantial part of a work as set out in the cases of Galago
Publishers and Rapid Phase Entertainment.23 First it is necessary to discuss the
rights of the artist.
23 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus 1989(1) SA 276A and Rapid Phase Entertainment CC v SABC 1997
JOL 393 W
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Figure 12
Candice Breitz Ex Libris (2009)24
Cibachrome photograph
Figure 13
Colin Richards Library of Lies (2009)25
Digital Print on Paper
The work of the artists Richards and Breitz in figures 12 and 13 respectively is
an example of how artists working independently of one another can produce
similar works based on similar ideas and or concepts. The books stand as a
metaphor for knowledge and the titles, text allude to the concept of contrived
truths. Colin Richards alludes to Roland Barthes' theory (as explained by
D'Alleva 2005, p136) that 'the author does not endow the text with organic
24 South African Art Times August 2010, p.43
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unity. Instead the work of art or literature is an artefact that brings together
any number of codes available in the artist's culture'. As articulated by
Barthes and Julia Kristeva, the concept of intertextuality reminds us that each
text exists in relation to other texts, to cultural expressions – texts owe more
to other texts and to their own makers. Breitz' work alludes to truth in a text
and the construction of knowledge. According to South African copyright
author AJC Copeling, in each instance, the respective artist will obtain
protection accorded to an original copyright work (Copeling, 1998, p.14).
(b) The Rights of the Artist
Dean (2006, p.1-33) says: 'In essence, copyright is the right to do or authorise
others to do, or prevent others from doing, the restricted acts which are designated
to the artist, and over which he/she has a monopoly'. The restricted acts (Section
7) in respect of an artistic work are: reproducing the work in any manner or form;
publishing the work if it was not previously published; including the work in a film
or a television broadcast. This includes making an adaptation of the work for
broadcast purposes, which includes the work, to be transmitted in a diffusion
service26.
Dean, (p.1-71) remarks that copyright is a prohibitive right when he says that
'Copyright is in essence a negative right, i.e. the right to prevent others from
performing certain acts in relation to a work. This right of prohibition is given effect
to, or enforced by and through the Court'
(c) What Acts infringe the copyright right of the artists and what does copying
mean ?
The Act refers to two forms of infringement: direct /primary infringement and
indirect/secondary. (Section 23(2). The latter type of infringement takes two forms:
unauthorised dealing with infringing copies of a work and permitting an infringing
public performance of a work to take place (Dean 2006,1-44). In this research
report I am only dealing with primary infringement.
25 Photograph of image taken by Renee Johannes with permission from Art on Paper Gallery, 44 Stanley,
Millpark, and Johannesburg.
26 Unless such service transmits a lawful television broadcast including the work and is operated by the
original broadcaster) (Section 7(d)) (Dean, p.1-34).
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As I referred to above an artist seeking to sue for copyright infringement must
firstly establish the subsistence of copyright in the work (i.e. originality and
existence in a material form) that is the subject of the proceedings, and whether
he/she is entitled to such copyright or the right to enforce it. Secondly, the artist
must show that rights under the copyright in the work have been infringed by the
performance of one or more of the restricted acts, without the authority of the
copyright owner (Section 23).
Direct acts of infringement are the inverse of the rights of the artist as stated in
Section 7, namely unauthorised reproductions and adaptations, publications,
including the work in a film broadcast or television programme. To copy in relation
to an artistic work is defined as a reproduction or adaptation (Section 1). An
adaptation of an artistic work includes reproduction of the works so that the original
substantial features thereof remain recognisable (Section 1). A reproduction in
relation to an artistic work is in turn defined to include a conversion of the art work
into a three dimensional form or if it is in three dimensions by converting it to two
dimensions. This latter form of reproduction is important in the context of the
discussion in the Rapid Phase Entertainment case where there was an alleged
infringement of a cartoon strip in the form of a television broadcast
It is not only misusing or misappropriating the whole of the work that infringes
copyright. The Act specifically states that misusing or appropriating a substantial
part of the work also constitutes infringement. (Section 1(2A)) (Dean, 2006,
p.1-37). The term substantial is open for interpretation by the Court, as it has not
defined in the Act. The interpretation of the term is both subjective and relative and
gives rise to problems.
Does the unauthorised copying of a small but essential part of a work constitute
copyright infringement? In practical terms, Dean states (2006, p.1-38) that:
The question of whether or not a substantial part of a work has been reproduced,
amounts to the degree of similarity between the original work and the alleged infringing
copy. The Court must determine what constitutes originality in the copyrighted work
and then view the alleged infringing copy from this perspective.
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Dean explains (p.1-38A) this to mean that:
As long as what is taken has substance in the original work (and is not de minimis
(insignificant) and has sufficient pith to constitute the embodiment of original
intellectual activity in a material form, copyright infringement could arise. The criterion
hinges on what has been taken from the artist whose work has been infringed, and not
what portion the infringing material makes up quantitatively of the contentious work.
The artist must identify those parts of his work that he / she alleges has been copied.
The Court's attention must be directed to the part of the work that is claimed to have
been reproduced, and not to those parts which have not. The Court also has regard to
dissimilarities between the contentious materials.
The Test for substantial copying was established in the leading case of Galago
Publishers v Erasmus. In this case the Court rationalised the assessment as to
whether a substantial part had been reproduced in a two-stage process. The first
consists of an objective comparison as to whether the two works are substantially
similar. Followed secondly by an analysis of whether a causal connection exists
between the infringed work and the alleged infringing copy. If either of these tests
is not met, namely that there is no objective similarity between the two articles, or
if a causal connection between them cannot be established, then no copying of a
substantial part of the copyrighted work has taken place and therefore there has
been no infringement (Dean, 2004, p.1-42A).
Although the test put forward by the Court appears fairly straightforward there are
other logistical problems. Dean argues (2004, p.1-42B) that:
It is not sufficient merely to show that there is a similarity between two articles and
that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work; but that an inference must be
drawn from all the facts of the particular case. On the other hand, it would be
unreasonable to require a party claiming copyright infringement to produce direct
evidence that the alleged infringer was actually caught in the act of copying the work
that is the subject of the claim. The absence of a cogent explanation for the similarity
between two works can create a strong inference that there has been copying.
Dean (2006, p.1-42B) reminds us that:
It is essential to appreciate that copyright in a work is only infringed by unauthorised
reproduction or adaptation if there is copying. Due attention must be given to whether
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the similarity between two items is attributable to common ideas or concepts embodied
in them, or to similarity of material expression of ideas.
As stated in the introduction to this research report, copyright is concerned with
copying the outwardly perceptible form and must not be confused with the rights
conferred by a patent in respect of a concept that is its subject matter or the idea
that is conveyed by a work (Dean, 2006, p.1-42B).
Earlier in this chapter I raised the issue of whether common ideas and concepts
should be excluded from the test that has been established by the Court to
determine whether a substantial part of a work has been copied. The case of
Gerhard Marx v Ireland Davenport and BMW S.A. (Pty) Ltd illustrates the difficulty
that artists encounter with the monopolisation of styles and common concepts.
Figure 14
Gerhard Marx Sheet2 Horizontal Figure 2 (2006)27
Cut and reconstructed map fragments
38x14cm
In the official summons issued by Marx, he alleges that from 2001 he created
original artworks by arranging fragments of road maps (for ease of reference this is
referred to as the 'map style'), which depicted aspects of the human form or
anatomy. Marx claims that BMW and Ireland Davenport, without his consent and
with flagrant disregard for his rights and reputation, made an adaptation of his
work and published the reproduction (in either electronic or hard copy form in the
Sunday Times of 19 February 2006). In a second claim based on the delictual claim
of passing off, Marx claimed that Ireland Davenport had copied his style;
alternatively they had failed to distinguish the style of human form and anatomy
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derived from road maps from Marx's own style. Marx alleges that he had acquired a
reputation for using the map style in his work, was the originator thereof and that
the style was unique to him and no other person. Marx claimed damages in the sum
of R1 000 000,00 a royalty amount that would be determined at a judicial enquiry
and in addition the sum of R1 500 000,00 in respect of the damage to his
reputation (Summons case No. 16543/2006, p.8). Marx's second claim of passing
off is not based on copyright and is generally an alternative to a claim of copyright
or trademark infringement where the claim does not fit strictly within the
requirements of Section 34 of the Trademarks Act28.
In this Section I focus on Marx's copyright claim. However, it is important from the
artist's perspective to know the difference between the statutory remedies afforded
to an owner of an intellectual property right, such as copyright, a trademark, a
patents and the common law remedy of passing off, which in the legal discipline is
known as an Aquilian action. Dean explains (2006,1-68) that the remedy of passing
off is derived from common law. Passing off is considered a to be a species of
unlawful competition. He gives the example of a situation where an author
associates himself with the renown or reputation of another author or his work
through similarity between the two works or aspects or characteristics of them. The
essence of a passing off claim is the protection of goodwill that a person has built
upon his own name or in his works from being misused by others.
27 Art South Africa 2006 volume 4 issue 03 Autumn p.10
28 Trademarks Act, No. 194 of 1993 (as amended)
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Figure 15
The Advertisement prepared by Ireland /Davenport (Pty) Ltd for BMW South
Africa (Pty) Ltd as it appeared in Sunday Times dated 19 February 2006.
Local journalist Matthew Krouse reported in the September issue of the Mail and
Guardian that just prior to the hearing of the Court case (on 9 October 2008) a
press statement was released by Dean, Marx's attorney, in which it was reported
that Marx, Ireland – Davenport and BMW South Africa had amicably settled the
case. In the report, the agency said it had no intention of associating its campaign
with Marx's work, adding that it fully supports the arts and regrets if any impression
to the contrary was given. According to Krouse the apology contradicted a report in
the Star earlier that week in which BMW spokesperson Benedict Malaga said the
company contests the assertion that it has infringed the rights of the artist, Gerhard
Marx, or plagiarised his work.
Regrettably for both artists and copyright lawyers, the allegations made by Marx
were allowed to stand unopposed and undecided by our Courts. There is a dearth of
cases dealing the infringement of copyright in an artistic work. The last such case
was that of Rapid Phase Entertainment where the Court took a firm position against
the monopolisation of ideas and concepts. It would have been interesting to see
whether the Court in Marx's case would have taken the same approach.
The similarities in the adopted style and the combination of the human anatomy are
striking even though the main subject matter is different. They go far beyond the
similarities that would be expected simply from both being used in a composition
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based on such a combination. Each work consists of a background of road maps, a
line drawing to depict the outline of the human figure and the method and
technique of depicting form, tone and depth have been copied. Although the overall
impression is very similar there has not been copying of any specific artistic feature
in the work.
The Court would look at the effect of the (a) many and obvious similarities; (b) the
combination of the road maps and the anatomy to the appearance of the work;
however both of these effects may not be sufficient to discharge the burden of
proving that Ireland Davenport had copied Marx's work because his work
incorporates features that, by themselves, are not original and the actual artistic
features of the work had not been copied. There is nothing original about using
maps and anatomy in an artwork. As referred to above, certain ideas expressed by
a copyright work may not be protected because, although they are ideas of an
artistic nature, they are not original, or so commonplace as not to form a
substantial part of the work. Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1)
S.A. 645A at p.649 and Klep Valves v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 1987(2) SA (A). It is
on this ground that it is submitted that the notion of combining anatomy and maps
would not have amounted to a substantial part of Marx's work. The idea, though
expressed in the composition, would not have represented sufficient of the author's
skill and labour as to attract copyright protection (Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v
Gay 1978(1) SA 184(c) at p.192).
In respect of the second leg of the test it could be argued that if there had been no
direct evidence of copying and the finding of copying was based on the extensive
similarities between the works then these similarities, coupled with the opportunity
to copy and in the absence of any acceptable evidence from Ireland -Davenport as
to the derivation of the work, may have led a judge to conclude, on a balance of
probabilities, that Ireland Davenport had copied from Marx. As referred to
previously the burden of proof rests on Marx and not on Ireland Davenport.
Although the advert is not an exact copy of any particular work executed by Marx, it
could be argued that there was intentional altered copying. The expressed ideas
which were represented by Marx in a material form i.e. the anatomy, maps, line
drawing technique, modus of using the density in the maps to give the impression
of shadow and tone /idea has been extracted and purposely altered. Ireland-
Davenport put together a number of artistic ideas derived from Marx's work in order
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to produce the advert. They copied Marx composition /combination of ideas in their
advert but did so with intentional modifications.
It is my contention that based on the decision in Rapid Phase Entertainment CC and
others v SABC [1997] JOL 393 (W) Marx's claim for copyright infringement would
not have succeeded. The reasons for this conclusion will become clear in the light of
the facts and the judgement set out below.
The facts in the Rapid Phase Entertainment v SABC case
This case involved a dispute arising out of alleged infringement of copyright. A
person infringes the copyright of the owner if, without the owner's consent
(Section 23), he/she does any act, which the owner has the exclusive rights to
do or to authorize. For ease of reference to the discussion of this case, the
plaintiff is referred to as Rapid Phase and the defendant as SABC. Rapid Phase
argued that SABC had wrongfully and unlawfully exploited characters in its
cartoon strip and its reputation, goodwill and the marketing power of the
comic to advance its own advertising campaign.
Rapid Phase Entertainment applied to Court, on the basis of urgency, for an
order interdicting the SABC from actively screening an advertisement of its
own services on its television channels, which Rapid Phase Entertainment
alleged to be a breach of its copyright, or, alternatively, to be a delictual
infringement of its common law rights.
The cartoon strip features as its main characters from the well-known cartoon
strip 'Madam and Eve' by the members of Rapid Phase Entertainment CC.
Madam, a white housewife, Eve, her black maid, and her mother, Mother
Anderson. Each is obviously recognisable by their consistent physical features,
dress and general appearance. They are reflected in a residence, participating
in domestic activities, such as preparing food, eating, relaxing, cleaning the
house and watching television. Apart from a description of its characters, the
special and distinctive quality of the cartoon strip is that it seeks to reflect
contemporary South African reality. It satirizes the relationship between South
Africans who are separated by race, ethnicity and class and it looks at how
those South Africans are attempting to come together in terms of the new
South Africa. The cartoon strip depicts relationships between a 'madam' and a
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maid, which is unusual in its closeness and in the muted nature of the
antagonism between them. The cartoon strip takes as its subject matter the
intimate, but difficult and often tension-ridden, relationship between employer
and domestic employee and turns this into a warm interaction, which is
popular with both black and white readership. The fictionalized relationship
between 'madam' and maid is closer and more intimate, and possibly more
humane, than the reality in South Africa. (Rapid Phase Entertainment CC and
others v SABC 1997 JOL 393 W P.4)
Rapid Phase presented a lengthy list of the following distinctive and original
features of Madam & Eve that they alleged had been copied:
(a) The peculiarly South African relationship between employer and employee in
the domestic environment. In no other employment environment is the
employer known as 'Madam' and the employee by her first name. Both the
employer and employee are almost always women and this is the
relationship captured in the cartoon strip. (p.5 of [1997] JOL 393(W))
(b) It is not a typical relationship of this type. Eve has unusual latitude in the
relationship; she is often shown coming out on top and much of the humour
derives from this inversion of the norm. The same may be said for the
'Mielie Lady'.
(c) It is also untypical in the warmth and relative equality between 'Madam' and
'Eve'. This is something not accepted by 'Mother Anderson'. The equality is
shown by 'Eve' sharing the sofa when the three watch television. In this, she
always sits next to 'Madam', but never next to 'Mother Anderson'. This
represents the cauterisation of the values of different generations of white
people, not just South Africans ('Mother Anderson' is from England, not
South Africa).
(d) The main characters are all women.... There are no male characters of any
significance. (p.6 of [1997] JOL 393 (W))
(e) 'Madam and Eve' is a satirical concept. Each cartoon strip, as its primary
object, seeks to make its audience laugh. Herein lies the seed of its
popularity and attraction. In this genre, it is the only mainstream cartoon
strip that is South African in conception and execution.
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(f) The characters are all given very distinctive, immutable features and
characteristics. This is a feature of cartoons:
(i) 'Madam's' features are her odd cartoon hairstyle, earrings and large round
eyes.
(ii) 'Eve's' features are her unusual hairstyle, earrings, maid's uniforms, duster and
slimness in comparison with 'Madam'.
(iii) 'Mother Anderson's' features are her diminutive size, receding white hair, pearls
(or beads) around her neck and a variety of facial grimaces.
In addition to the physical characteristics the following defining characteristics
were relevant: The relationship between 'Madam' and 'Eve' is far more equal than
the traditional norm; 'Eve' is obviously aware, and approves of the new rights and
equalities in South Africa; 'Mother Anderson' embodies many old colonial values.
She has a rather more traditional and authoritarian attitude to 'Eve's' role in the
household.
The 'Mielie lady' is largely a catalyst for interaction between the main characters.
However she is normally depicted selling her mielies by crying, 'mielies, and
mielies'. Sometimes she is seen trudging up a road.
The setting, situation and arrangement of the cartoons is unique in that It is that
of a domestic home; It shows the interaction of a 'madam', a maid and the
'madam's' mother; It often takes place around a television set. (p.7 [1997] JOL
393 (W))
The alleged infringement was based on the broadcast of an advert by SABC in
1997 soliciting support for small business enterprises to advertise on its
television programmes at a discounted price. The advertisement has one set of
particularly important sequences that is described in the court records
(Page 10 of [1997] JOL 393 (W)) as follows:
(a) A robust black lady bearing mielies on her head trudges up a hill
calling 'mielies, mielies'.
(b) Three women are sitting on a sofa in a living room. A large white
woman with a blonde bouffant wig wearing gold earrings is sitting in
the centre of the sofa with her feet up. She is obviously the
'madam'. On her right is a black woman dressed in a maid's uniform
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carrying a feather duster and whose hair is held back in a ponytail
with a ribbon and she is wearing earrings. On the left of the 'madam'
is an elderly white woman with receding white hair, wearing pearls
and with a scrunched up face.
(c)They watch the closing frames of a popular soap opera and then they
see the Mielie lady advertising her wares on television. The response
of the maid is amazement; of the 'madam' firstly surprise then
irritation and finally warmth. The aged mother appears furious.
(d) The scene turns to the exterior of the house where the 'madam' and
her maid are purchasing mielies from the Mielie lady that the maid
carries away.
(e) The Mielie lady departs the scene in one of three vans indicating that
they are the Mielie Lady's commercial transport. (p.9 of [1997] JOL
393 (W))
Rapid Phase claimed that the cartoon strip is an artistic work, (there was a
dispute as to whether the cartoon strip was a literary work the SABC later
admitted that it was an artistic work), and that SABC has copied it by
reproducing and adapting it or has broadcast it. As referred to earlier in this
chapter, a person infringes the copyright of the owner if, without the owner's
license, he or she carries out any act which the owner has the exclusive rights
to do or to authorize (Section 23(1) of the Act).
As an alternative to copyright infringement Rapid Phase contended that the
SABC's action constituted a common law delictual claim of appropriating or
diluting its incorporeal property. A full discussion of this second claim does not
fall within the scope of this paper save to say that Rapid Phase were not
successful on this alternative claim. The Court held that the common law claim
of passing off is generally confined to trademarks or claims which identify a
person's goods or services and the reputation of a mark or name and its
resulting selling power.
Research Report/#879528v1
03082011
43
The Court based its decision on the current status of the law already
established in the Galago Publishers case 29in so far as the difficulty of the
dichotomy between ideas and the expression of ideas is concerned by
confirming that:
It is only partially correct to say that ideas are not the subject of copyright ….
'... Given that there exists a good copyright in a work, the law does not protect a
general idea or concept that underlies the work, nor any one fact or piece of
information contained therein. However, a more detailed collection of ideas, or
pattern of incidents, or compilation of information may amount to such a
substantial part of the work that to take it would be an infringement of the
copyright, although expressed in different language or other form, it being a
matter of fact and degree whether the dividing line has been impermissibly
crossed.
On the basis of this authority, the Court came to the conclusion that there is
no recognizable copying of any situation or incident in Rapid Phase's cartoons
in the television advertisement.30 The question, that remained to be
considered, was, therefore, whether there was an 'adaptation' of the work,
defined to include a transformation of the work in such a manner that the
original or substantial features thereof remain recognizable or whether the
SABC has exercised some other right, which the copyright owner has in law.
The Court's reasoning was that:
On the basis of the artistic character or attributes of the cartoon strip in the
present case, the presentation of an incident in dramatic form with live characters
who do not bear the names of those portrayed in the artistic work, even if they do
have broadly similar physical characteristics or expressions, cannot amount to a
broadcast of 'the work' or a transformation thereof in which the original or
substantial features of the work remain recognizable. In this regard the function
of an artistic work is crucial. To constitute an infringement it is the artistic
29 In the case of Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd and another v Erasmus, 1989 1 SA 276(A) at 284 C–D Corbett JA
quoted, with apparent approval, a passage from Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria in The Modern Law of Copyright
at 33
30 It is important for the reader to bear in mind that the conversion of a two dimensional work to a three
dimensional work, is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether there has been an infringement of
copyright. In this regard the Court said that: Even though Section 1 of the Act refers to the 'reproduction' in
relation to an artistic work, as including a version produced by converting the work into a three-dimensional
form or, if it is in three dimensions, by converting it into two-dimensional form the SABC did not reproduce
the cartoon on its television screens.
Research Report/#879528v1
03082011
44
features or attributes of the artistic work, which have to be transformed, or
adapted, not some concept, which it conveys.
The Court had to differentiate this case from the Natal Picture Framing case
(which was discussed in detail above in chapter I) where the lawyers for Rapid
Phase argued that the SABC'S advertisement was a 'colourable' imitation of
the cartoon strip. The Court differentiated the cases on the following grounds:
(a) Natal Picture Framing Co Ltd v Levin was a case where a picture
contained a combination of ideas that formed part of a picture
produced by Levin, which, despite differences in details, was a
colourable imitation of the original (Page 19 of [1997] JOL 393 (W)).
(b) Levin's picture was clearly a copy of the Natal Picture Framing
Company's picture. Nothing similar had happened in this case.
The Court summed up its final reasons by stating that the relationship
between Rapid Phase's cartoon strips and the SABC's television advertisement
is completely different in that:
Whilst the cartoon characters and those in the television advertisement are
personifications of the same prototypes, they are different characters. The
persons portrayed in the advertisement are not called by name nor do they
purport to be Madam, Eve and Mother Anderson.
Although Rapid Phase identified what it regarded as clearly similar distinctive
characteristics of the characters, they did not persuade the Court that the
characters were the same or that they could be confused with each other or
that the human personifications in the television advertisement are colourable
imitations of the cartoon characters. Rapid Phase's application was therefore
dismissed with costs and it had to pay the costs of the entire court
proceedings.
The Rapid Phase Entertainment case establishes the authority that it is the
artistic features or attributes of an artistic work that have to be transformed
and not some concept it conveys. When applied to Marx's case, the reasons his
case may not have succeeded are as follows:
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(a) The actual artistic features of any of Marx's specific works were not copied.
(b) One artist should not be entitled to a monopoly over certain ideas
and combinations, styles and techniques.
(c) The advert was not a colourable imitation of any existing work
produced by Marx
(d) There is no authority in our law that establishes altered copying as
an infringement of copyright.
(e) The combination of anatomy and maps as Marx's distinct style is
easily equated with trademark characteristics. The purpose of a
trademark is to protect consumers from deception in the market
place by prohibiting the use of source identifying marks if such use is
likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the product.
American copyright lawyer Laura Heymann (2007, p.65) states that
'the gist of an action for passing off is deceptive resemblance. In
such a case the offender is charged with deceiving the public into
taking his goods and passing off the goods as the plaintiffs. A visual
comparison of the competing articles is often all that is required. If
the overall impression is that 'they just do not look sufficiently
similar' then the action will fail'. South African authorities on
Trademarks, Webster and Morley (2007, p.10), make it clear that
'an action for infringement of artistic copyright, is very different from
an action for trademark infringement. Copyright is not concerned
with the overall appearance of the other persons work but with its
derivation.'
The core of the judgement in the Rapid phase Entertainment case confirms the
attitude of the Courts not to allow the monopolisation of adapted or
transformed concepts. I concur with Dean's support of the decision. He takes
the point further by saying that: (p.1-42)
Where the idea and its expression are indistinguishable, the Courts should be slow
to find that copyright infringement has occurred as there is a danger that a
monopoly can be conferred upon an idea free of the conditions and limitations
imposed by patent law.
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Based on the interpretation of the law in this case, artists have wide latitude to
explore the ideas and concepts of other artists provided caution is exercised in
ensuring that the new work is not a colourable imitation of a copyright work,
or that there is no copying of the artistic features of another artist's work.
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CHAPTER 3 - COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: FAIR USE (UNITED STATES) AND
THE EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, ALSO
KNOWN AS FAIR DEALING
In this chapter I discuss the exceptions to an infringement of copyright also known as
'fair dealing' - and compare it to the defence of fair use that forms part of the law in the
United States of America (USA). I examine the four factors that a Court considers when
deciding whether copying in a particular case is justified. To illustrate these factors, the
reasoning of the Court in the two reported cases concerning infringement of copyright in
an artistic work involving Koons will be used to show the limitations of the South African
exceptions of fair dealing. For ease of reference the case of Art Rogers v Koons,
Sonnabend Gallery Inc (1992)31 will also be referred to as String of Puppies. Andrea
Blanch v Jeff Koons, The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Deutsche Bank32, (2005)
is also referred to as Niagara. Both the cases of String of Puppies and Niagara highlight
the idea expression dichotomy, parody and the way in which the American Court deals
with the issue of whether a substantial part of a work has been copied.
In the Blanch v Koons case Judge Sack (Blanch v Koons 2006, p.12) set out the
universal principle of the law of copyright which is 'to motivate the creative activity of
authors and deemed inventors by the provision of a special reward. The monopoly
created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public'.
Judge Sack, however acknowledges that artists use other art as inspiration in the
creative process and gives a fair and balanced idea of copyright by stating that:
'excessively broad protection would stifle, rather than advance, the law's objective.
Monopoly protection of intellectual property that impedes referential analysis, would
strangle the creative processes'.
In order for the law to achieve its objectives Judge Sack remarks (Blanch v Koons, 2006,
P.13) that:
in terms of the 'fair use' doctrine 'a balance must be struck between the property rights it
establishes in creative works. Creative works must be protected up to a point, but so too, the
ability of artists to express themselves by reference to the works of others. The fair use
doctrine mediates between these two sets of interests'.
31 Art Rogers v Koons, Sonnabend Gallery Inc31 United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit 1992
32 Andrea Blanch v Jeff Koons, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 2005
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There are certain understandable instances when it is in the public interest for the work
to be reproduced or used without requiring the agreement of the copyright holder. In
South Africa the Copyright Act recognises these instances and provides for statutory
exceptions to copyright infringement. These exceptions are limited to certain acts and
can only be invoked on the assumption that an act of infringement has occurred. Dean
(2006, p. 51) gives the reason for this as 'substantiated on the basis that it is considered
to be in the public interest that the copyright owner should not have a monopoly in the
performance of particular acts in relation to his work'. Section 12 of the Act makes
provision for a limited number of statutory exceptions to direct infringements of
copyright. Any fair dealing with an artistic work or an adaptation of that work does not
infringe that copyright when the source (my emphasis) is mentioned and it is –
(a) For the purposes of research or private study, or the personal private use of the
person using the work;
(b) For the purposes of criticism or review of that work or of another work; or
(c) For the purposes of reporting current events in a newspaper, magazine or similar
periodical (Section 12 (1) (a), (b), and (c)).
Furthermore the copyright in an artistic work or an adaptation thereof is not infringed if
it is for use in Judicial proceedings (Section 12 (2) or to the extent justified for the
purpose by way of illustration in any publication, broadcast, sound or visual record for
teaching. In addition there is a proviso which says that the use must be compatible with
fair practice and the source is mentioned, as well as the name of the author if it appears
on the work (Section 12 (4) or where such reproduction is intended exclusively for a
lawful broadcast and it is destroyed within a 6-month expiration period longer periods of
use may be agreed by the owner of the relevant part of the copyright work.
A reproduction of an artistic work will be permitted provided that the reproduction is not
in conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and is not unreasonably prejudicial to
the legitimate interests of the copyright owner (Section 13)33.
33 The copyright in an artistic work shall not be infringed by its inclusion in a cinematograph film or a
television broadcast or transmission in a diffusion service, if such inclusion is merely by way of background
or incidental to the principal matters represented in the film, broadcast or transmission (Section 15(1)).
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Copyright of artworks situated permanently in a street, square or a similar public place
shall not be infringed by its reproduction if it is included in a cinematograph film
television broadcast or transmission in a diffusion service (Section 15).
The position in the United States of America – the fair use doctrine
The exceptions in South Africa are referred to as 'fair dealing' and should not be
confused with the doctrine of 'fair use', which is a general defence to copyright
infringement in America and is not applicable in South African law. The basic
premise of both fair dealing and fair use is that it should not be prejudicial to, or in
conflict with, the legitimate interests of the copyright owner. Section 15 of the Act
specifically provides that a reproduction of an artistic work will be permitted
provided that the reproduction is not in conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work and is not unreasonably prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the copyright
owner
In America criteria have been laid down for assessing what constitutes fair use of a
work under American law. In the case of Blanch v Koons Judge Sack (Blanch v
Koons 2006, p.13) confirms the four factors that are considered by the Court in
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use:
(a) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non profit educational purposes i.e. whether the
work is transformative;
(b) The nature of the copyrighted work, i.e. factual or creative;
(c) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(d) The effects upon the plaintiff's potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Each of these factors is discussed and considered with reference to the two
copyright infringement cases relating to artistic works and Koons. Briefly the facts
of the two cases are as follows:
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String of Puppies:
Figure 16
Jeff Koons, String of Puppies (1988)34 (R) Art Rogers (L)
Porcelain
42 x 62 x 37 inches
The Facts
In 1980 Art Rogers, a 43-year-old professional artist-photographer from
California, was commissioned by Mr and Mrs Scanlon to photograph their eight
new German Shepherd puppies. After the Scanlons purchased their prints for
$200, Puppies was incorporated in Rogers' catalogue of photographs.
Puppies had been used and exhibited on several occasions. In 1989 it was
licensed for use in an anthology called Dog Days. In 1984 Rogers licensed
Puppies, along with other works, to Museum Graphics, a company that
produces and sells note cards and postcards with high quality reproductions of
photographs. Museum Graphics produced and distributed the Puppies note
card. The first edition was of 5,000 copies and a second edition of the same
34 Jeff Koons (2010) [online], available at http://wwwjeffkoons.com/site/index.html [17 December 2010]
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number has been printed (ie when artists such as Duchamp (1919), Braque
(1912) and Picasso elevated banal objects into the art forum). 35
In 1986, Koons began creating a group of 20 sculptures for a 1988 exhibition
at the Sonnabend Gallery that he called the Banality Show. Koons claims to
work in an art tradition dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century
(ie when artists such as Duchamp (1919), Braque (1912) and Picasso elevated
banal objects into the art forum). This tradition defines its intentions as
altering the meaning of the original object that has been appropriated and an
entirely new meaning set in its place. The Court remarked that Andy Warhol
used the same means of reproduction of multiple images of Campbell's soup
cans.
Koons acknowledged that the source for String of Puppies was the Museum
Graphics note card of Puppies which he purchased. After buying it, he tore off
that portion showing Rogers' copyright of Puppies. Koons claims he saw
certain criteria in the note card that he wanted to incorporate in his work.
Koons gave his artisans one of Rogers' note cards and told them to copy it. He
guided the creation of a three-dimensional sculptural piece from the two-
dimensional photograph. When it was finished, String of Puppies was displayed
at the Sonnabend Gallery, which opened the Banality Show on November 19,
1988. Three of the four copies made were sold to collectors for a total of
$367,000; the fourth or artist's copy was kept by Koons. Koons' use of Puppies
to create String of Puppies was not authorized by Rogers. A friend of
Scanlon's, who was familiar with the photograph, called Rogers to tell him that
he had seen a 'colorized' version of Puppies. Rogers successfully sued Koons
for copyright infringement36
35 The facts in this case have been summarised from the reported judgement obtained at: National Coalition
Against Censorship : Art Law Library (2011) [online], available at: (http://www.ncac.org/art-law/op-
rogcfm) [9 February 2011]
36 National Coalition Against Censorship Rogers v Koons (2011) [online], available at
(http://www.ncac.org/art-law/op-rogcfm) [8 February 2011]
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Based on the following significant factors the Court found Koons infringed Rogers'
copyright, concluding that –
 Rogers' photo was original and qualified for protection in terms of the
copyright law;
 Koons had copied the photograph without consent from Rogers. He
admitted having access to the image. This direct evidence of copying and
the substantial similarity between the two works was sufficient to infer
copying; and
 Koons had not just copied Rogers' idea, but also the expression of it,
rendering the copying contrary to the law.
 Although Koons raised a fair use defence, claiming his work was a
permissible parody of Puppies. Koons suggested String of Puppies satirized
society at large by criticizing the social deterioration the mass production of
commodities has caused. The Court was not convinced that parody was
applicable as a justification. Koons' had parodied society at large and not
Rogers' photograph as the object of the parody. Instead they found String
of Puppies to be a 'satirical critique of material society', and not a parody of
the photograph itself. The Court was also concerned about the effect that
Koons' work would have on demand for the original photograph and
authorised derivative works.37 The Court determined in my opinion
incorrectly that Koons had produced String of Puppies for monetary gain,
and therefore that it prejudiced the market for the licensing of the
reproductions and derivative works of the original work by decreasing
demand for similar works. In evaluating his defence of fair use, the alleged
bad faith clouded the issue of whether the work was transformative in
nature. Furthermore the sculpture did not replace the demand for Rogers'
original photograph.
37 National Coalition Against Censorship 2011. Significance of Rogers v Koons.
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Niagara:
The Facts
The second case involving Koons which sheds light on the doctrine of fair use,
arose seven years later. Judge Sack colourfully summarised the facts of the
case as follows (2006 p.4-8)38
This case arose in 2001 in connection with a series of Koons' work entitled Easy
Fun – Ethereal. Deutsche Bank commissioned the works in collaboration with the
Guggenheim Museum, Berlin in 2000. To create the Easy Fun – Ethereal
paintings, Koons appropriated images from advertisements and from his own
photographs, scanning them into a computer, and digitally superimposing the
scanned images against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes. He then printed
colour images of the resulting collages for his assistants to use as templates for
applying paint to billboard sized canvasses. The Easy Fun – Ethereal paintings,
seven in all, were exhibited at the Deutsche Guggenheim Berlin from October
2000 to January 2001.
The painting in question, namely, Niagara, consists of fragmentary images
collaged against the backdrop of a landscape. The painting depicts four pairs of
women's feet and lower legs dangling prominently over images of
confectionary – a large chocolate fudge brownie topped with ice cream, a tray
of doughnuts and a tray of apple Danish pastries – with green fields and the
Niagara Falls in the background.
38 National Coalition Against Censorship (2011) Blanch v Koons [online] available at http://www.nac.org/art-
law/op-bla.ctm [8 February 2011] Facts taken from the Judgement in the case of Andrea Blanch v Jeff
Koons, The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Deutsche Bank, United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, 2005
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Figure 17
Jeff Koons, Niagara (2000) 39
Oil on canvas
1187 x 170 inches299.7 x 4318cm
One of the pairs of legs in the painting was adapted from a photograph by
fashion photographer, Andrea Blanch.
Figure 18
Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals by Gucci (2000) in Allure magazine40
39 Jeff Koons' (2011) Artwork Easy Fund Ethereal : Niagara [online], available at
http://www.jeffkoons.com/site/index.htmlImage taken from the annexure to the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals
40 Figure 18 taken from the annexure to the Judgement in the case of Blanch v Koons
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Koons scanned the image of Silk Sandals and saved it with the other images
that form part of the composition of the paining, Niagara. Only the legs and
feet were used from Blanch's photograph. The background was discarded.
Koons inverted the orientation of the legs so that they dangled downwards
together with other components of Niagara rather than slanting upwards at a
45-degree angle as they appear in the original composition of the photograph.
A high heel was added to one of the feet and the original colours were
modified. Koons did not seek permission from anyone before using the image.
Blanch saw the painting at the Guggenheim Museum in New York during the
exhibition in 2002, and on 10th October, 2003, she issued summons against
Koons for copyright infringement.
The District Court concluded that the painting, Niagara did not infringe
Blanch's Silk Sandals as its use of the image from Silk Sandals constituted fair
use. Blanch appealed against this decision. However, on Appeal the Appeal
Court affirmed the finding on 26th October 2006.41
Judge Katzman distinguished the finding in the case of String of Puppies,
stating that: (Blanch v Koons, 2006, p.33)
The facts in Niagara are quite distinguishable from those in String of Puppies42 in
which it was alleged that Koons had slavishly recreated a copyrighted work in a
different medium without any objective indicia of transforming it or for
commenting on the copyrighted work.
What follows is a discussion of the four fair use factors that the Court
considers when making a decision on whether the use of a work is fair. The
four factors are not given equal weighting by the Court in its conclusion as to
whether fair use is a justifiable defence.
41 Facts taken from the written judgment issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
dated 26th October 2006.
42 Rogers v Koons, 160, F 2ed 301 (2nd Circuit 1992)
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FACTOR 1: THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE
Under this main factor, the Court considers sub factors such as commercial
and non-commercial uses, parody, satire and transformative value. The sub
factors are considered in the discussion.
(a) Transformative uses
Judge Sack (Blanch v Koons 2006, p.15) quoted the leading authorities
on the application of this factor saying 'the way in which the Court
addresses the issue of transformative use is whether the new work
merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning or message. In other words, whether
and to what extent the new work is transformative'.
Sack qualifies the position (p.15) by stating that transformative use is not
a prerequisite:
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of
fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science in the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such transformative
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing
space... if the secondary use adds value to the original … if copyrightable
expression in the original work is used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings … this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society (Blanch v Koons, 2006,
p.15).
The Court held that (Blanch v Koons 2006, p.21) the test for whether
Koons' use of Silk Sandals was transformative was based on whether it
merely superseded the object of the original creation, or instead added
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message. This test adequately
described Koons' transformative adaptation of Blanch's photograph.
Koons had used a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy
American lifestyles magazine, changed its colours, background, the
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medium, the size of the objects pictured, their details and significantly
altered the purpose and meaning of the photograph, combining it in a
painting commissioned for exhibition in a gallery space'. The Court
therefore concluded that the use in question was transformative.
(b) Commercial use
There is a perception that where a user makes a profit from the
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work that the use is unfair. In the case
of Niagara, (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.20) the Court found that commercial
benefit flowing to the user is not a dispositive factor. The reasoning
behind this is based on fairness. The Court held that:
The commercial / non-profits dichotomy concerns the unfairness that arises
when a secondary user makes unauthorised use of a copyrighted material to
capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying the original
work. Consistent with these principles, Courts will not sustain a claimed
defence of fair use when a secondary use can fairly be characterised as a
form of commercial exploitation, i.e. when the copier directly and exclusively
acquires financial rewards from its use of the copyrighted material.
Conversely, Courts are more willing to find a secondary use fair when it
produces a value that benefits the broader public interest. The greater the
prize of economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the exclusion of
broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favour the
copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair (Blanch v
Koons 2005, p.20).
Koons' Lawyer successfully argued (Blanch v Koons, 2005, p.20) that the
commercial nature of a use could in itself not be seen as a negative
consideration as uses which are exempt from copyright infringement
(Section 107) of other copyright works, including news reporting,
comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship and research are generally
conducted for profit. Therefore, the legislature could not have intended a
rule that commercial uses are presumptively unfair.
The Court then adopted a flexible approach by stating that (Blanch v
Koons 2005, p.21) 'the commercial objective of the secondary work is
only a sub factor within the first factor (i.e. the purpose and character of
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the work). The more transformative the new work, the less important
such factors as commercialism become in a finding of fair use. A finding
that a work is substantially transformative will discount the secondary
commercial nature of fair use'.
The preamble to Section 107 of the United States Copyright Act contains
exceptions to infringement, which are similar to the exceptions in
Section (12) of the South African Act.43 In Niagara (p22) it was argued
that when balancing the interests of the parties, 'transformative art is of
greater relevance than market harm'.
The Court emphasized that it considers whether a commercial use
amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original and it clearly
supersedes the object of the original and serves, as a market
replacement for it, making it likely that cognisable actionable market
harm to the original will occur. When the second use is transformative,
market substitution is less likely and market harm not readily inferred. In
the case of Niagara, it was found that the work was substantially
transformative, and therefore the significance of the other factors
including commercialism was lower. Referring to Koons', the Courts
attitude was that 'it could hardly be said that Koons' economic gains from
Niagara were to the exclusion of broader public benefit, the public
exhibition of art is widely considered to have value that benefits the
broader public interest' (Blanch v Koons, 2005, p.22). The success of this
argument was crucial to Koons' case. It is reported in the judgement
(Blanch v Koons 2005, p.22) that Deutsche Bank paid Koons $2 million
for the seven paintings. Koons reported that his net compensation
attributable to Niagara was $126,877
43 Section (12) (a) For the purposes of research or private study, or the personal private use of the person
using the work; (b) For the purposes of criticism or review of that work or of another work; or (c) For the
purposes of reporting current events in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical (Section 12 (1) (a),
(b), and (c)).Furthermore the copyright in an artistic work or an adaptation thereof is not infringed if it is
for use in: Judicial proceedings (Section 12 (2) or to the extent justified for the purpose by way of
illustration in any publication, broadcast, sound or visual record for teaching: provided that such use is
compatible with fair practice and the source is mentioned, as well as the name of the author if it appears on
the work (Section 12(4))
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(c) Parodies, satire and justification for copying
In the case of Koons v Rogers, the Court defined the term parody as
being 'when one artist, for comedy or social commentary, closely imitates
the style of another thereby creating a new art work that makes
ridiculous the style and expression of the original'. The target of parodist
criticism is primarily another creative work, whilst satire criticises the
subject matter of the original (McLean, 1993, p.6). Koons' argument that
parody was the target of String of Puppies failed. However, in the Niagara
case the Court held (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.22) that: 'Niagara may be
characterised as satire. Its message appears to target the genre of which
Silk Sandals is typical, rather than the individual photograph'.
Koons explained (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.24) why he used Blanch's
image:
Although the legs in the Allure magazine photograph Silk Sandals might
seem prosaic, I considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my painting
rather than legs I might have photographed myself. The ubiquity of the
photograph is essential to my message. The photograph is typical of a
certain style of mass communication. Images almost identical to them can
be found in almost any glossy magazine, as well as in other media. To me,
the legs depicted in the Allure photograph are a fact in the world, something
that everyone experiences constantly; they are not anyone's legs in
particular'. By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in his painting,
Koons commented on the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in
Allure magazine. 'By using an existing image, I also ensure the certain
authenticity or veracity that enhances my commentary … it is the difference
between quoting and paraphrasing and ensures that the viewer will
understand what I am referring to'.
The Court therefore concluded (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.24) that Koons
had established a justification for the appropriation of parts of Blanch's
photograph and were satisfied that the use of an existing image
'advanced Koons' artistic purposes'.
Fair dealing with an artistic work in South African copyright law requires
that use of the original is confined to the acts referred to in Section 12
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and in addition the use must be accompanied by an appropriate
acknowledgement of the source. Dean says (2006, p.52) that:
When an artistic work is used for the purposes of criticism or review of that
work, or for the purposes of reporting on current events in a newspaper, use
without permission or an acknowledgement would be regarded as bad faith'.
In the Niagara case, the Court (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.25) came to the
conclusion that Koons had used the photograph without first asking
Blanch's permission. However, as there was no authority to the effect
that failure to seek permission for copying, in itself, constitutes bad faith,
the Court adopted its flexible approach and held that being denied
permission to use a work does not weigh against a finding of fair use.
FACTOR 2: NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK
Judge Sack (Blanch v Koons p.27) rationalised that two distinctions as to the
nature of the copyrighted work have emerged in the evaluation of the second
factor namely: 'whether the work is expressive or creative, i.e. is the work
fiction, or more factual? Greater leeway is allowed to a claim of fair use where
the work is factual or informational'. The Court concluded (p.28) that although
Blanch's photograph could have been said to be creative, the nature of the
work did not have any significant implications for an overall fair use analysis.
Although the creative nature of artistic images typically weighs in favour of the
copyright holder, the nature of the work may be of limited usefulness where
the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose. The
second fair use factor (i.e. the nature of the copyright work factual or creative)
was found to have limited weight in the analysis because Koons used Blanch's
work in a transformative manner to comment on her image's social and
aesthetic meaning, rather than to exploit its creative elements such as
lightning, angle and composition.
FACTOR 3: AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE PORTION USED
In considering the amount and substantiality of the portion copied, the Court
pointed out that (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.28) 'the question is whether the
quantity and value of the materials used are reasonable in relation to the
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purposes of the copying'. Like South African law, the analysis into
substantiality calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials
used, but also about their quality and importance. Koons asserted that his
artistic goals led him to incorporate pre-existing images such as Blanch's
photograph into his paintings in order to reference certain facts in the world.
The main question the Court had to decide is whether, once Koons chose to
copy Silk Sandals, he did so excessively, beyond his justified purpose?
The test is to ascertain whether the use is reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying. The Court (Blanch v Koons 2005, p.28) concluded that
Koons' copying of Silk Sandals was indeed reasonable when viewed against his
goal; to convey the fact of the photograph to viewers of the painting, and in
light of the quantity, quality and importance of the material used. He did not
copy the aspects of Silk Sandals that related to Blanch's individualised
expression. In light of Koons' choice to extract only the legs, feet and sandals
in Silk Sandals from their background, the Court found Koons' statement that
he copied only that portion of the image necessary to evoke a certain style of
mass communication', to be persuasive. The Court concluded (p.29) that the
amount and substantiality of Koons' copying was reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying, and this factor definitely favoured Koons.
FACTOR 4: MARKET EFFECTS
(Blanch v Koons 2005, p.30) The Court remarked that this factor was initially
considered to be the most important element of fair use but it recognised
instead that all the factors are to be explored and the results weighed
together. In considering this final factor the Court considered the market value
of Blanch's photograph when Sack, J said that:
Consideration is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys the
market for the original work, or its potential derivatives, but also to whether the
secondary use usurps the market of the original work. The market for potential
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in
general develop or licence others to develop. Blanch acknowledges that she had
not published or licensed Silk Sandals subsequent to its appearance in Allure and
that she had never licensed any of her photographs for use in works of graphic or
other visual art. She also admitted that Koons' use of her photograph did not
cause any harm to her career or upset any plans she had for Silk Sandals or any
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other photograph, and that the value of Silk Sandals had not decreased as the
result of Koons' alleged infringement'
In light of these submissions, the Court found (p.31) that it was plain that
Niagara had no adverse effect upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work. Furthermore it concluded that the aim and purpose of the
law would be better served by allowing Koons' use of Silk Sandals than by
preventing it. The case against Koons was therefore dismissed.
Judge Katzman (p.33) in his concurring judgement was scathing of Blanch's
intentions in pursuing the claim for copyright infringement against Koons in his
remark that: 'Not only has Blanch failed to show that use of Koons' work
actually harmed her in any way, but she did not seek copyright protection for
her work until after viewing Koons' picture, suggesting that she is more
interested in a windfall recovery than in policing her rights to any foreseeable
derivative uses'.
Dean (2006, p.52) asserts that while the American Act refers to fair use and
the South African Act to fair dealing, the two terms are synonymous and
should be taken into account.
These factors [the factors in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act] should be
taken into consideration and be given due weight in Court when determining
whether, in any given situation, a potentially infringing act constitutes a fair
dealing with regard to the work in question.
Whilst Dean says (2006, p.1-52) that the terms are synonymous Coenraad
Visser (2009, p.595) of the University of South Africa criticises Deans'
oversimplification and fundamental misstatement of the law when he says:
The view has been expressed that fair dealing and fair use are synonymous. This
is not merely an oversimplification but a fundamental misstatement. In American
Law, fair use is a general defence to copyright infringement. Fair dealing in
Section 12 is a limited exception for certain stated purposes only (research or
private study, criticism or review, own reporting or current events). In the United
Kingdom too, fair dealing is permitted only for the purposes stated above. It is
irrelevant that the use is fair generally, or fair for the purposes stated in the Act.
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In this way then fair dealing in English law is, as in South African law more
restricted than fair use in American Law
In 2008, the Shuttleworth foundation and the Canadian International
Development Research Centre commissioned the University of the
Witwatersrand to conduct research on the relations between copyright and
education. The aim of the research and the ensuing report focused on the
exceptions to copyright infringement and the limitations and regulations
relating to eh use of learning materials in teaching, research and learning.
Although the report is based in favour of open access to copyright materials
for the purposes of research and education (http:itweb.co.za 26 May 2006).
The ideas and attitude to the concept of fair dealing and fair use provide a
contrasting opinion to Dean.
The Shuttleworth Report (p.14) criticises fair dealing as 'an idea that is
enshrined in the copyright laws of many countries that are, or have been,
members of the British Commonwealth, or that were once British Colonies'.
The report states that the Copyright Act does not give a specific definition of
what fair dealing means and does not specify how much of a work may be
reproduced without asking permission of the copyright holder (p.14). The Act
merely states that 'the amount copied needs to be compatible with fair
practice [and] shall not exceed the extent justified by the purpose.
According to Shuttleworth, Section 12(1), Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention
also deals with the reproduction of copyright protected works in much the
same vague manner. It allows for reproduction in certain special cases
provided that the reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of
the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. As a
signatory to the Berne Convention, the exception is applicable in South Africa.
Contrary to Shuttleworth's opinion, Dean (2006, p.52) argues that, 'the
concept of fair dealing is deliberately vague in order to enable the Court to
take all the circumstances of a potentially infringing act into account'. He
remarks that Australian law has adopted the principles of fair use for the
purposes of interpreting the term fair dealing under the Australian Copyright
Act, 1968, the American criteria has been used, with the addition of a further
one, namely whether the work can be obtained within a reasonable time at a
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normal commercial price. Dean argues that the American and Australian
approaches are commonsensical and reasonable and should be followed by the
South African Court. All the mentioned factors should be taken into
consideration and be given due weight in the Court in determining whether, in
any given situation, a potentially infringing act constitutes a fair dealing of the
work in question.
Although Dean says that the term fair use is synonymous with fair dealing and
the rationale and purpose may also be synonymous he does not go as far as
proposing that the law be amended to include the broader statutory doctrine
contained in the American Statute. It is my submission that the South African
Courts are however acutely aware of all the factors considered by the
American Courts. The method of applying them to a case of copyright
infringement is less formal and gives greater latitude to the Court in the
decision-making process.
Indeterminable factors and vagueness create a disadvantage for artists who
fear being sued. If Dean is correct in his submission that fair dealing and fair
use can be equated then, the door is wide open for artists to use copyright
images if the use is transformative in nature. It is my submission that fair
dealing in South Africa should be read in the context of both Sections 12 and
15 of the Act the Act. The latter Section gives latitude to artists to reproduce
works provided such reproduction is not in conflict with the normal exploitation
of the work and is not unreasonably prejudicial to the interests of the
copyright owner. The phrase 'normal exploitation of the work' is open to
interpretation in the court and in deciding a case a Court would take account
of the principles in the doctrine of fair use.
Copyright and the Constitution: Ralph Borland
In South Africa (unlike the United States) intellectual property (which would
include the rights granted to an artist under the Copyright Act) does not enjoy
special status under the Constitution.
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South African artist Ralph Borland (born 1974), argues that44:
'The notion of fair dealing in the general exemption provided by Section 12 of the
Copyright Act should be interpreted in accordance with the constitutional right to
freedom of expression, particularly the right to artistic creativity, analogous to the
concurring judgment in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v (Finance) B.V. CC …
Intellectual Property Law, generally, and Copyright Laws especially, have been
overzealously extended and enforced worldwide as well as in the South African
legal system … Intellectual Property Laws should be limited in accordance with the
constitutional right to freedom of expression and for the benefit of long standing
processes of cultural and artistic development.
In 2005, South African Breweries International (hereinafter referred to as
SAB), owners of the Black Label trademark, sued Laugh It Off Promotions CC
for trademark infringement in terms of Section 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks
Act45: Section 34(1) (c) recognises a trademark as a valuable commercial
asset which requires protection against dilution by blurring and tarnishment.
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when the trademark is parodied or used in an
offensive or given a negative connotation (Webster and Morley 2007, p.12-
44). In this case Laugh It Off Promotions had produced and sold T-shirts
employing the layout and colours of SAB'S registered marks for a beer label
but with a different message. The Trademark Black Label was replaced with
Black Labour, while the slogan America's lusty, lively beer was replaced with
Africa's lusty lively exploitation since 1652 no regard given world wide
(Webster and Morley p.12-44). It is imperative for the reader to comprehend
that unlike copyright, where the artwork is protected against unauthorised
acts, it is not the mark per se that is protected but the selling power or
advertising value which it has acquired as a result of expensive advertising.
(Webster and Morley p.12-46).
44 Ralph Borland.net (2007) [online], available at (http://ralphborland.net)/sos/index.html25/05/2007)
45 34. Infringement of registered trade mark -
(1) The rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be infringed by:
(c) the unauthorised use in the course of trade in relation to any goods or services of a mark which is
identical or similar to a trade mark registered, if such trade mark is well known in the Republic and the use
of the said mark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character
or the repute of the registered trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.
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Figure 19
Figure [19] shows how the general layout and colours of the registered mark
were appropriated. However, the words 'Black Label' were replaced with 'Black
Labour' and 'Carling Beer' with 'White Guilt'. The laudatory part on the label
was replaced by 'Africa's lusty, lively exploitation since 1652' and 'No regard
given worldwide'. (Judgement SCA Paragraph 5]46. 1 Currie 2010: Notes on the
Laugh It Off Decision).
Figure 2047
The Court held that a finding of unfair use or likelihood of detriment to the
repute of the marks hinges on whether the offending expression is protected
under Section 16(1) of the Constitution or not. If the expression is
constitutionally protected, what is unfair or detrimental, or not, in the context
of Section 34(1)(c) must then be mediated against the competing claim for
free expression. The case was decided in favour of Laugh It Off Promotions CC
46 (Currie 2010: Notes on the Laugh It Off Decision).
47 Figure taken from notes on the Laugh It Off decision compiled by Iain Currie
Research Report/#879528v1
03082011
67
as SAB could not prove substantial harm or detriment which, seen in the
context of the case, amounts to fairness.
In interpreting Section 34(1) (C), the Constitutional Court put heavy emphasis
the notion of 'fairness'. For the purposes of this research report, this case is
important, in the context of how the Constitution Court has intervened in the
area of intellectual property law. The case concerns the dilution provisions of
Section 34(c) of the Trade Marks Act and does not establish freedom of speech
or parody as a defence to copyright infringement. Borland argues that Section
12 of the act should also be interpreted on the same basis as Section 34 of the
Trademarks Act i.e. the acknowledgement of freedom of expression and then
whether the infringement of copyright is unfair and is materially harmful to the
work an or the author. Although this argument has merit it has not been
applied by the Courts to a copyright infringement case.
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CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSIONS
Originality And Authorship
Lawyer, Owen Dean (2006, p.22) elevates the author or maker of a work as 'the
cornerstone of copyright law'. The Act uses the term author to designate the maker of a
type of work, which can be the subject of copyright. The person who arranges for an
artistic work to be made is the author (Section 1). Depending on the medium used by
the artist to create the work, the law stipulates who the author is. For example the
author of a photograph is the person who composes the photograph not the person who
physically takes the photograph, unless the composer and the person who takes the
photo are the same person.
United States Attorney, Willajeanne McLean (1993, p.389) argues that the trend in
Postmodern movements in art, such as appropriation, has been to remove the author
from the text, therefore allowing the reader or viewer to determine what is intended.
McLean's misguided argument is adopted from an essay by the French literary critic and
theorist Roland Barthes titled The Death of the Author (1965). The subject of his essay is
the determination of meaning of a text. It is my contention that McLean's application of
Barthes theory on the determination of meaning is not applicable in the context of
copyright law. As argued in detail in Chapter 1, Roland Barthes (1930-1980), who moved
away from rigid Structuralism, dramatically declared the birth of the reader and the
death of the author when he abandoned Saussure's emphasis on language as a system
of structure that pre-exists the individual speaker. D'Alleva (2005, p.135) says that the
notion that language pre-exists the individual speaker was part of a larger structuralist
rejection of the humanist idea of the autonomous, thinking, coherent, integrated human
subject. In her words 'the humanist tradition holds that the human beings are rational
thinkers who know the world through language that is fixed and conveys fixed
meanings'. D'Alleva explains that in art history this leads to an emphasis on the artistic
genius as the centre figure in cultural production, so that the scholar's primary goal is to
uncover the artist's intentions. D'Alleva (2005, p.135) takes the argument further when
she says 'the artist's intentions to communication what is intended may be important to
him or her as individual however meaning on a larger cultural sense, cannot be reduced
to her intentions'. An artist may communicate ideas without intending to do so. D'Alleva
(2005, p.135) links the application of Barthes theory to art history when she says 'in this
spirit, Roland Barthes dramatically declared that the birth of the reader must be at the
cost of the death of the Author'. In my opinion this explains how artists have come to
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understand the concept of an author and therefore the rejection of the notion of an
author as a creative and original thinking genius. It is evident that both Postmodern
literary and visual artists were influenced by these theories. Mclean alludes to theory of
Structuralism and Post -structuralism which Adams says (1997, p.134) is generally
traced to the linguist Ferdinand Saussure (1857-1913). It was followed by
Post-structuralism, which de emphasises the author even more and casts authorship as a
nineteenth century 'Romantic Myth' imbued with patriarchy and elitism (Adams 1997,
p.134). Adams (1997, p.101) acknowledges that although these theories of
Structuralism and Post-structuralism were applied to art, they contradict the biographical
method of art history which approaches art history in relation to aspects of the artist's
life and personality and hence the legal personality of the artist. Copyright law is
concerned with the legal interest of the artist as author.
I agree with Heymann's (2007, p.64) argument that in terms of copyright law, the
author has a different 'personality' and one which is not related to the trope of romantic
author as espoused in literary and art critical writing. For Heymann 'market based
interests are at the heart of copyright law.' Copyright law appeals to creators' interest to
monetize their cultural production' Adams (1997, p.101) correctly points out that 'we
have come a long way from the mythic associations of artists with the gods.
Technological developments and transparency as to techniques and methods of
production have softened traditional conventions about the nature of genius (Adams
1997, p.116). Adams puts the argument squarely into context when she says 'there is a
direct connection between an artist and his or her art and it takes seriously the notion of
authorship'. it is my contention that this notion is narrower than that postulated by
Structuralism and Post-structuralism and fits more securely with the notion of author as
envisaged in the legal life of the artist as an author or maker of a work.
This line of thinking was famously taken by Marxist critic, Walter Benjamin in his essay,
the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, which was written in the context
of the threat that photography made to traditional and avant-garde art. Appagnesi and
Garratt 2007, p.18) point out that:
For Benjamin the authority or autonomy of original works of art derives from their
irreproducibility, which gives them a magical aura, a charismatic halo that surrounds
authentic art objects because they are uniquely irreplaceable and hence priceless. Benjamin
was concerned that the aura / fetish of scared uniqueness would be eliminated by mass
reproduction essentially by photographic printing of original work of art in widely distributed
books, posters, postcards and even postage stamps.
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Contrary to McLean Appignanesi and Garrett (2007, p.40) are of the opinion that the
autonomy and aura of an original work of art has survived but is transferred to the
artist. They say that :
The artist becomes the aura itself, as in the case of London artists Gilbert and George
who displayed themselves as living sculptures in 1970. Duchamp had already led the
way by focusing publicity on himself as the enigma who renounced art to play chess
instead. It is also argued that Warhol's reproductions are not about art but the
ultimate commodity. The aura of the artist is reduced to fame and celebrity.
In the context of copyright, art writer, Jesse Wilder (1998, p.373) claims that:
Postmodern artists express doubts about progress, post industrial capitalism and grand arts
movements they do not put any significance on the concept of true. Morphed images and the
meanings they create are more significant and true to Postmodern artists than claiming to
understand the essence of the original. They believe modern life is in flux, everything blends
and blurs nothing is stable and there are no absolutes.
To contextualize Wilder in the theoretical perspective she says (1998, p.373) that
Postmodern artists predict that the Simulacrum (a fake version of the original) would
become more powerful and useful than the authentic object. The same can be said of
Koons. According to copyright lawyer, Steven Shonack (1993, p.281), 'Koons'
supporters depict him as a Wunderkind whose Postmodernism descends from the best
in American and European Art. However it is my contention that one must not lose
sight of the relevance of such arguments to copyright law, which defines the term
author and is concerned with the protection of the author from unauthorised copying.
There is no definition of 'original' in the Act. 'Original' in the context of copyright does
not mean that the work must in any way be inventive. The characteristics of avant-
gardism, novelty and creativity do not appear in the context of copyright law. Originality
relates to the degree of skill and labour involved in the making of a work.48 Originality
should not be equated with the meaning of 'authentic', which is defined in the Oxford
English Dictionary (ninth edition) as: 'of undisputed origin or genuine'.
48 Saunders v Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd 1987(2)(A)
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Monopolisation of Ideas
The Rapid Phase Entertainment case confirms the decision of our Courts when it
comes to guarding against the monopolisation of ideas by an artist. On the facts of
the case set out in chapter 2 above, it is my contention that the SABC relied heavily
on the nature of the characters in the comic strip to convey the message of its
advertisement. Anyone who is familiar with the cartoon characters seeing the
advert would have been under the distinct impression that the characters were
Madam and Eve. Although, on the surface the decision appears to be unfair, Judge
Wunsch in his conclusion to the case makes the important observation regarding
fairness when he says:
Relevant to the decision were the criteria of fairness, honesty and the sense of justice
of the community in assessing the importance of free market and competition in an
economic system. And further, that, the degree of appropriation of a concept would
substantially determine whether the community would regard it as unfair, dishonest or
contrary to morality.
This attitude of the Courts in turn gives artists latitude and the freedom to use
other works of art as inspiration thereby encouraging creativity.
I support Dean's view (2006, p.42C) that where the idea and its expression are
indistinguishable, the Courts should be slow the find that copyright infringement
has occurred as there is a danger that a monopoly can be conferred upon an idea
free of the conditions and limitations imposed by patent law. To constitute an
infringement of copyright, it is the artistic features or attributes of a work that must
be transformed or adapted, not some concept that it conveys (Rapid Phase
Entertainment quoted in Dean, 2004, p. 42C). Essentially, if an idea has been
expressed in a material form and has become an integral part of a work it may still
not be protected if there is doubt as to whether the idea and its expression are
indistinguishable there is no copying of the artistic features and or attributes.
However, in a case where an idea and its expression are indistinguishable the Court
may come to a different conclusion where there is direct evidence of copying. In the
Natal Picture framing case it was easier to prove copying as Natal Picture Framing
Company had proof that Levin had its picture in his possession.
Marx has gained a reputation in the art community and was concerned that his
style / combination of ideas had been copied. In support of Marx, his style is a
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signature of his work, however whether he is or should be entitled to a monopoly in
respect of the style of combining maps with human anatomy is debatable.
South African art critic Alexandra Dodd (2006, p.72) comments on Marx's unique
style and ideas when he says that 'For the past five years Gerhard Marx has been
creating works composed of map fragments … figures emerge from the lines of the
maps…skulls, heads, reclining figures, feet are superimposed on the landscape …
map transformation as poetic gesture'.
Figure 21
William Kentridge, Small Atlas Procession (2000)49
Etching
43.6 x 35.5cm
Other South African artists such as Fiona Pool, Mute Tshabalala and William
Kentridge have also adopted this combination of map fragments and anatomy in
their work. Pool figure [22] uses maps, grids in a series of etchings the strength of
the decision in Rapid Phase Entertainment CC it is unlikely that Marx would have
succeeded in the infringement of copyright claim as the actual artistic features of
Marx's work had not been copied by Ireland Davenport, merely the ideas or
combination of ideas that represent his style. Whether he would have succeeded on
the basis of the second claim of passing off is uncertain.
49 Photograph by Renee Johannes from the Caversham Press Collection Exhibition held a the Johannesburg Art
Gallery with permission from the Standard Bank Gallery. Printed by Malcolm Christian, The Caversham
Press. Published by William Kentridge and Malcolm Christian.
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Figure 22
Fiona Pool Packing up Waiting (2009)50
Sugar lift on Japanese paper edition of 15
210 x 29 cm
Figure 23
Tshabalala, Josiah Friends Like This (2005).51
Collage mixed media (size unknown)
50 Pool 2009, p.1
51 Creative Expressions Sasol New signatures Catalogue of Finalists 2005
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Without commenting on or discussing the merits of the case artist and art critic Paul
Edmonds (2008) balances the scales in favour of the poor artist against the luxury
German car manufacturer when he says:
The appearance in several of last week's national newspapers of a BMW ad featuring
drawings made or cut out and reconstructed maps may just have demoted young
Johannesburg artist Gerhard Marx to the 'artists' whose work looks like the BMW ad.
When I saw it, the likeness to Marx's work was so unmistakable that I thought (a little
disappointedly) he must surely have sanctioned this use of his methodology. I was
never under the impression that Marx had done the work himself – the drawing is, in
short, 'piss poor'.
According to Edmonds, artists are not strangers to the issues of copyright. However
in his opinion, the advert draws too heavily on Marx's work, 'a young artist just
establishing himself in a fickle and treacherous, underfunded industry'.
The interface between trademarks, copyright and passing off
In South Africa our Courts have demarcated the boundary between trademark and
copyright protection. In the case of Verimark v BMW it was held that trademark
protection does not give copyright protection52 Likewise our Courts have
demarcated the boundary between the statutory rights created in the Copyright Act
and passing off, which is a common law action based on the law of delict. It is
similar to misrepresentation.
The Courts have become wary of entertaining claims of copyright infringement
under the guise of trademark infringement or passing off. In the Payen Components
SA v Bovic and Others case, Judge Corbett cautioned against the blurring of the
boundaries between these two are as of the law. When he says :
Court should be wary of allowing the sharp outlines of the two established
branches of the law of unlawful competition, namely copyright and passing off, to
be fudged by allowing a vague penumbra around the outline. Unlawful
competition should not be added as a ragbag and often-forlorn final alternative to
52 Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW 2007 (6) SA 263 (SCA)
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every trademark, copyright, design or passing off action. In most of the cases it is
one of the established categories or nothing (At 453F/G-H).53
The nature and aims of the rights protected in terms of the Copyright Act, the
Trademarks Act and the common law right of passing off are complex and easily
confused. Heymann (p.65) argues that the Courts should pay more attention when
'content owners attempt to use an overbroad notion of copyright law to assert
trademark-based claims'. She clarifies (p.64) the aim of trademarks as protecting
the source of goods and the consumer from deception in the market in contrast to
copyright law, the aim of which is to induce creativity for economic reward:
Trademark law is concerned with the source or sponsorship of goods or services and
the way in which they are presented to the public. The goals of trademark and
copyright law differ in that copyright concerns are about incentives for the artist. …
Trademark law although it can also be explained in economic terms is by contrast not
justified in terms of promoting creativity. Unlike copyright and patent law, trademark
law is not designed to offer the trademark holder incentives to create; the prevailing
view is that creativity is not the aim of a trademark. Rather trademark law is typically
justified in terms of the public interest of protecting consumers from deception in the
market place.
It is within the context of this interface between copyright and trademarks that I
return to address the case of Laugh It Off Promotions CC54 This case is quoted by
South African artist Ralph Borland (born 1974) as a blanket of protection of
freedom of expression in the face of intellectual property laws (i.e. copyright,
patents and trademarks). He argues that:
(First) '… The notion of fair dealing in the general exemption provided by Section 12
(i.e. the provision relating to Fair dealing) of the Copyright Act should be interpreted in
accordance with the constitutional right to freedom of expression, particularly the right
to artistic creativity, analogous to the concurring judgment in Laugh It Off Promotions
CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. CC'
(Second) 'that Intellectual Property law, generally and copyright laws specifically have
been overzealously extended and enforced worldwide as well as in the South African
legal system'.
53 Payen Components SA v Bovic and Others 1995 (4) SA 441(A)
54 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. CC.
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(Third) 'Intellectual Property laws should be limited in accordance with the
constitutional right to freedom of expression and for the benefit of long standing
processes of cultural and artistic development.'
Each of the arguments raised by Borland is discussed in the order in which they are
raised followed by a discussion on the case of Laugh It Off Promotions. This
discussion will bring us back to the interaction between trademark law, copyright
and passing off.
First, fair dealing is not a general exemption in our law.55 It is an exception to
copyright infringement confined to certain acts (Section 12 of the Act). In the
United States of America it is a general defence to copyright infringement. As
referred to above in chapter 3 the defences and exceptions in South African and
American law are different. The South African exception of fair dealing is much
narrower. Fair use in the United States of America was distilled from case law and
later codified in the federal legislation.
Second, the duration of copyright has not been extended in South Africa since the
first promulgation of the Patents, Trademarks Act no.9 1916 Act.56 Borland does not
specifically refer to the Berne Convention or TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights).In an artistic work the duration of copyright is for the
life of the author plus fifty years from the end of the year in which the author dies
(Dean, Service 13, 2006, p.1-2 and Section 3(2)(a) of the Act). Dean, (2006,
p.88E) points out that South Africa's copyright law is influenced by and is part of an
international network of copyright protection which is aimed at a reasonable degree
of standardisation of forms and levels of protection and the granting of protection to
foreign works on a reciprocal basis. The situation is brought about by the Berne
convention on copyright and latterly by TRIPS.57
55 Visser, C p.596
56 This Act was repealed in 1965 and was very closely based on the British at of 1956
57 TRIPS has influenced South African law in that foreign persons and corporate bodies are qualified persons
for the purposes of 3(1) of the Act (Dean, 2006, p.1-89). The other major international copyright
convention is the Universal copyright convention, which dates from 1952 and was revised in 1971. South
Africa is not a signatory to this convention (Dean, p.1-92). In South African cinematograph The Registration
of Copyright protects films and performance in Cinematograph films No 62 of 1977 and The Performers
Protection Act 11 of 1967. A performance and a cinematograph film may qualify as an artistic Act and may
also be protected in terms of the copyright Act. The right in terms of these two Acts are not copyright but
are analogous to (Dean, 2006, p.1-111).
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TRIPS however does not detract from the National treatment of a copyright
infringement case. There is a misperception amongst artists such as Borland that
there is a uniform protection of copyright throughout the world. There is no
universal or international copyright that automatically protects an author's work
throughout the world. Protection in a particular country depends on the national
laws of that country and international treaties that it has signed.
Third, this case of Laugh it Off Promotions concerned the interface between the
guarantee of free expression enshrined in Section 16(1) of the Constitution and the
protection of intellectual property rights attaching to registered trademarks as
envisaged by Section 34 of the Trademark Act and consequently to related
marketing brands more particularly the tarnishment of a trademark
The case of Laugh It Off Promotions falls squarely within the domain of trademark
law and involved the infringement of a trademark. Constitutional Court Judge,
Moseneke refrained from making any finding on any of the submissions by Laugh It
Off Promotions CC on the findings of the Supreme Court of Appeal on fair use of a
mark under Section 34(1)(c) of the Trademarks Act and freedom of expression. He
reached the conclusion that the claim of infringement of the SABC's trademarks
marks stood to be dismissed because no likelihood of economic prejudice had been
established. Secondly, where no economic harm had been shown, the fairness of
parody or satire or lampooning did not come into consideration.
In the dissenting judgment, Sachs, J confirmed that, unlike in the United States
(p.68) there are no enclaves of protected expression in parody or satire. Therefore
the mere characterization of an expression as such would not be decisive in what
constitutes fair use under the anti-dilution protection of Section 34(1)(c). Ordinarily
all categories of expression, save those excluded by the Constitution itself, enjoy
constitutional protection and may be restricted only in a way that is constitutionally
authorized. Artists should therefore not interpret the case as authority to
appropriate or adapt a copyright image on the grounds of freedom of expression.
Copyright is a Technical Subject
Copyright is a technical subject and it should be offered as a subsidiary course
for students in all disciplines covered in terms of the Act for example literary,
musical artistic architecture, photography, film, broadcasts computer
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programming and dramatic works. The dearth in case law concerning visual art
and copyright could indicate that the law is doing its job and this strength in
our law lies in its effective balancing of the interests of the parties concerned.
Legal costs are major contributing factors to the dearth of case law in South
Africa. In South Africa, the art fraternity came together in support of Marx and
held an auction to raise funds for his legal expenses.According to a report in
the Mail & Guardian dated 28th October 2008, the auction raised approximately
R450 000,00. It was further reported that legal fees were estimated to be
R300 000, and that the balance of the funds would be used to set up a David
and Goliath Fund, the aim of which is to assist artists in future copyright
infringement cases.
Figure 24
Velazquez's Pope Innocent X 165058
Medium and measurement unknown
Copyright is a valuable commercial asset and it should be given recognition as
such. Copyright laws do not appear to have had a curtailing effect on artists
who still use other art as inspiration for their work. Artists such as Siopis and
Francis Bacon draw from art that is part of the public domain perhaps out of
fear of prosecution or else as a respect for the proprietary rights of other
artists. The duration of copyright is generous, perhaps over generous. As a
58 Francis Bacon Edicionis Polographis original Spanish edition 1994 S. 54 Barcelona Balmes p.6
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further incentive for artists and in order to minimise the threat of litigation, it
is my contention that the interests of the parties would be better served if the
duration of copyright were shortened to a maximum of ten years. Artists
should confine themselves to using images that have fallen into the public
domain so as to avoid litigation. This would also alleviate the exploitation of
the skill and labour of an artist.
Figure 25
Bacon, F Study after Velazquez's portrait of Pope Innocent X 195359
Vanity of vanities! Says the preacher. All is vanity. What do people gain from all
the toil at which they toil under the sun? A generation goes, and a generation
comes, but the earth remains forever. The sun rises and the sun goes down, and
hurries to the place where it rises. The wind blows to the south, and goes around
to the north; round and round goes the wind, and on its circuits the wind returns.
All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not full; to the place where the streams
flow, there they continue to flow. All things are wearisome, more than one can
express; the eye is not satisfied with the seeing, or the ear filled with hearing.
What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done;
there is nothing new under the sun. Is there a thing of which it is said, 'see, this
is new'? It has already been, in the ages before us. The people of long ago are
not remembered, nor will there be any remembrance of people yet to come by
those that come after them. (Ecclesiastes 1: 2-11)
59 Francis Bacon Edicionis Polographis original Spanish edition 1994 S. 54 Barcelona Balmes p.6
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